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ABSTRACT 
Since 2001, the status of the EU arms embargo on China has had important 
implications for the United States.  As an issue in the U.S.-EU, China-EU, and China-
U.S. bilateral relationships, the status of the embargo has both been perpetuated and 
weakened by issues relating to security, human rights, and trade.  The embargo debate 
continues to raise awareness on these issues as well as on competing interests and 
concerns over the true intent of an EU-China strategic partnership. 
American security interests would be negatively affected if the EU were to lift the 
embargo.  The strategic implications of such an action would disrupt the current regional 
balances of power and potentially raise the probability of conflict.  The EU has great 
economic interest in lifting the embargo in terms of gains in total trade, weapons sales, 
and the export of dual-use technology.  However, American pressure and increased 
popular awareness on human rights issues within the EU have affected the EU’s decision-
making about the embargo.  Formal and concerted efforts to lift the embargo stalled in 
2005, but it remains in Washington’s interest to continue to discourage EU governments 
from making shortsighted efforts to obtain financial gains without first considering long-
term strategic implications. 
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American leaders are facing tough decisions on policy toward China.  China’s 
rapidly growing economy and military capabilities have caused strong unease among 
American policymakers who have searched for appropriate policy responses including 
containment, engagement, and hedging as well as complimentary bilateral and 
multilateral approaches.  Given the lack of political reform in China, as well as China’s 
involvement in weapons proliferation and human rights abuses, the implications for 
American interests of China’s rise are often hotly debated. 
Since 2001, the United States has been actively engaged in what it calls the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly in the Middle East, and so to some extent it 
has been distracted from Europe and Asia.  In 2003, American involvement in the war in 
Iraq and widespread European perceptions of American unilateralism caused a rift among 
the United States and several European countries.  In the same year, several European 
and Chinese leaders declared their intention to foster a “strategic partnership” based on 
multipolarity and began discussing an end to the EU arms embargo. 
Overall, the question that this thesis seeks to answer is the following: Since 2001, 
how have American interests been affected by Chinese and European Union attempts to 
end the EU arms embargo as a step in pursuing a Sino-EU strategic partnership?  Related 
questions include: 
1)  How would American security interests be affected if the EU lifted the 
embargo?  What might be the strategic implications of such an action? 
2)  What economic interest would the EU have in lifting the embargo?  What 
would the EU hope to gain in total trade, weapons sales, and the export of dual-
use technology? 
3)  What instruments of American pressure may affect the EU’s decision-making 
about the embargo?  To what extent has popular support within the EU for EU 
principles of human rights stalled the removal of the embargo? 
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4)  To what extent are current U.S.-EU relations strained by the American 
perception that attempts by EU governments to lift the embargo constitute 
evidence of counterbalancing by China and the EU against the United States?  
Alternatively, do Americans view these attempts by EU governments as 
shortsighted efforts to obtain financial gains without considering long-term 
strategic implications? 
5)  What does China hope to gain in terms of military technology and imports 
from Europe that would help to lessen trade imbalances?  How is this a part of 
China’s quest for a normalized relationship with the EU? 
6)  To what extent have the 2005 Anti-Secession law and China’s failure to 
address EU human rights concerns by ratifying the UN Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, as promised in 1998, been factors in perpetuating the embargo?  
Furthermore, how have the still imprisoned Tiananmen Square protesters affected 
human rights concerns in Europe? 
7)  To what degree are current Sino-EU relations strained by the failed attempts to 
lift the embargo?  In what ways has the tone of the annual EU-China summits 
changed since 2003, when the concept of an EU-China strategic partnership was 
most strongly evoked? 
8)  What should an effective U.S. policy toward China entail to foster American 
interests in terms of security and human rights principles, and trade? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The international relations discipline often suggests balance of power theories in 
which states seek to balance against or bandwagon with stronger powers.  In the post-
Cold War era, the opposition to the United States is not so clearly defined.  A balance 
must be found between international differences in ideology and culture on one hand and 
a desire for economic prosperity and security on the other.  While the GWOT has been 
the focus of American foreign policy, the future of the triangular relationship between the 
United States, Europe, and China will be critical for all parties in terms of economic 
prosperity and security. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Debate 
Some conservative American think-tanks have suggested that China and some 
European nations are striving for multipolarity with the United States in mind as their 
object.1  At stake are the EU arms embargo, cross-Strait balance of power, and human 
rights issues.  Conversely, Europeans, particularly France and Germany, have actively 
sought a strategic partnership with China, including consideration of ending the embargo.  
In response to the United States, Europe has downplayed the Sino-European relationship 
and defined it mostly in economic terms. 
2. The Context 
There have been several periods of hardening tensions between the United States 
and China in recent years, including the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the 1995-
1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the 1999 B-2 bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, and the 2001 EP-3 midair collision.  Between 1992 and 1995, China also 
generated a hardening of tensions in Asia, after it applied strong pressure on several 
Southeast Asian nations over territorial disputes in the Spratly Islands.  The result was a 
perceived “China threat” in Southeast Asia, which led to initiatives to strengthen 
alliances with the United States in order to counterbalance the threat, including the 1998 
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in the Philippines and the 1998 port facilities 
agreement in Singapore to accommodate American aircraft carriers.2  In response, 
between 1999 and 2001 Beijing sought unsuccessfully to rally European support against 
American ballistic missile defense.3  From these experiences, the Chinese learned two 
                                                 
1 David C. Gompert, et al. China on the Move, a Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese 
Strategic Policies and their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations. National Defense Research Institute 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 46. See also, David Shambaugh. “The New Strategic 
Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise.” The Washington Quarterly. Washington, D.C.: 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (Summer 2005): 12. 
2 Leszek Buszynski. “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. 25, 3 (December 2003): 352. 
3 Phillip C. Saunders. China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2006), 5. 
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valuable lessons: attempts at strong-armed unilateralism invite receptiveness to American 
military power in Southeast Asia, and in Europe, aggressive “coalitions to restrain the 
United States are infeasible because of the high value other great powers place on 
cooperation with Washington.”4  Since then, China’s diplomacy has been softer and less 
threatening, at a time when the worldview of the United States has been changing in 
reaction to 9/11. 
In addition to China’s admittance into the World Trade Organization, 2001 
proved to be a turning point in the foreign policies in both Beijing and Washington.  The 
Bush administration began actively pursuing China’s support for the Global War on 
Terror and was otherwise distracted from Europe and Asia.  Then President Jiang Zemin 
gained cooperation against terrorist separatists in the western province of Xinjiang, and 
Beijing also benefited from American preoccupation in the Middle East.  Washington 
was suddenly less critical of the human rights issues of ethnic “separatists” and now more 
concerned with offensive efforts against “terrorists.”  Although China opposed the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions on Iraq, it did not take the aggressive lead in 
diplomatic efforts to oppose it, as Germany and France had hoped.  Instead, it warmed 
relations with Washington.5  Because of the unpopular war in Iraq, Europe sought to 
distance itself from association with American unilateral and hegemonic behavior by 
becoming increasingly critical of the Bush administration.  In this environment, China 
moved to establish strategic partnerships with Europe, anticipating more receptivity than 
it found in the 1990s.  What are the implications of strengthening ties between China and 
Europe for the United States?  Can China and Europe play balance of power against the 
United States by striving for multipolarity? 
3. Opposing Views 
There are two schools of thought on the strengthening ties between China and 
Europe.  The liberal or idealist camp argues that China is pursuing mutually beneficial 
                                                 
4 Phillip C. Saunders. China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2006), 5. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
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economic agreements, demonstrating the stabilizing effect of growing economic 
interdependence.  This theory also argues that even after Beijing reaches a position of 
prosperity, it will continue to abide by peaceful international norms because there is no 
reason why China would not want to be even more prosperous, especially considering the 
“high cost” and “low benefit” to non-compliance.6  In recent years, China and the EU 
have “become each other’s leading trading partners,” as trade has grown to forty times 
what it was thirty years ago.  In addition, the EU has become “the largest foreign supplier 
of technology and equipment to China, and one of the top foreign direct investors in 
China.”7  Of note, China’s large aircraft order from the struggling Airbus conglomerate 
has been critical in reducing negative earnings for the company and fostering friendly ties 
and working relationships in Europe. 
The realist school argues that stronger EU-China ties represent an effort to 
counter American hegemony by both Europe and Asia, as well as a move by China to 
overcome American containment initiatives.8  Realists maintain that China’s diplomatic 
shift since 2001, commonly referred to as its “charm offensive,” demonstrates the use of 
“soft power” to counterbalance against “soft containment.”  Its softened stance furthers 
its intention of using economic gains to fund military capability, regional hegemony, and 
eventual territorial expansion in Taiwan and the Spratlys.  Beijing’s promotion of ties 
with Europe in the annual EU-China summits, have fostered strategic partnerships and 
planning of military exchanges, training, joint exercises, and are seen as the heart of this 
strategy.9  Of particular importance to the Sino-European relationship, according to the 
                                                 
6 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis. Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy Past, Present, and 
Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 193. See also Zalmay Khalilzad. The United States 
and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 
26, and Jiang Yong. “Economic Security: Redressing Imbalance” China Security vol. 3 no. 2 (Spring 
2007): 66. 
7 David Shambaugh. “European and American Approaches to China: Different Beds. Same Dreams?” 
Sigur Center Asia Papers no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, March 2002), 1. 
8 Zalmay Khalilzad. The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 17, 19, and 70. See also Richard K. Betts. Conflict after the Cold 
War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 75. 
9 David Shambaugh. “European and American Approaches to China: Different Beds. Same Dreams?” 
Sigur Center Asia Papers no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, March 2002), 7. 
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realist perspective, is the downplaying of human rights concerns in China, which is the 
hinge in China’s hope to end the EU embargo on military equipment and technology.10 
Some realists would also argue that Europe has been distancing itself from the 
United States.  In recent years political commentary in the media have compared the 
1990-91 Persian Gulf War to the 2003 war in Iraq, as an acute shift in American foreign 
policy from multi-lateral coalition-building to a unilateral “go-it-alone” policy.  This 
argument also holds that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Europe and its 
reservations about the war were brushed aside and considered to be largely irrelevant.  
Additionally, this argument concludes that a lack of European reconstructive efforts in 
Iraq is retribution for Washington’s disregard.  Robert Kagan argues that the Europeans 
and Americans no longer share the same “strategic culture” and that Europe has evolved 
into a liberal realm of “self-contained world laws and rules and transnational negotiation 
and cooperation.”  American diplomacy, he argues, relies on “an anarchic Hobbesian 
world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the 
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of 
military might.”11  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Europe and the United States no longer share the common security threat of the 
“Russian bear.”  Instead, divergent applications and views of international diplomacy 
may add to the rift. 
In January 2003, after “quietly approaching the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to explore the possibility of initiating a security dialogue,” Beijing 
and NATO met for security discussions.12  In October 2003 the sixth EU-China summit 
agreed to cooperation on satellite navigation, tourism, and a “new mechanism for 
industrial policy dialogue.”  In January 2004 China and France agreed to a “joint 
declaration to deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership in political, economic, 
                                                 
10 CamillaT. N. Soerensen. “The EU’s Approach toward Relations with Tokyo and Beijing,” China 
Brief vol. 7 no. 9, The Jamestown Foundation (May 2, 2007): 10. 
11 Robert Kagan. Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order (New York, 
NY: Vintage Books, 2004), 4. 
12 David Shambaugh. Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2005), 254. 
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and cultural arenas.”13  Without question, PRC and Europe have moved closer together in 
many unprecedented ways.  However, the post-Tiananmen Square EU arms embargo 
remains unchanged to this day.  From a realist perspective, EU member governments are 
generally much more willing to end the EU embargo than is the U.S. government.  First, 
the post-colonial Europeans no longer have immediate interests in the East Asian region, 
nor—with the exceptions of France and the UK—are they any longer capable of 
projecting military power in the region, so they would not be threatened by a more 
powerful China in the same way as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.  Even still, the 
French and UK military presence in East Asia has been described as merely occasional.14  
Furthermore, Michael Yahuda has said that although France possesses some islands in 
Asia and Britain is a still a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement, “it is 
doubtful whether either would claim to contribute materially to the key defense issues in 
the region.”15  Second, European defense industries lack the massive domestic sales of 
their counterparts in the United States and Japan and would therefore have much to gain 
from access to Chinese defense markets.  However, from a practical or political 
perspective, human rights, while important to Washington, also have a tremendous 
importance in the European Union that cannot easily be overlooked.  The status of the EU 
arms embargo continues to be actively debated. 
In reality, the EU-China summits and strategic partnership of 2003 have fostered 
economic interests but not security and strategic concerns, in part “because of the EU’s 
general uncertainty about its security role in East Asia.”16  In spite of consistent lobbying 
by Tokyo and Washington, in late 2003 the EU “declared its intention to work towards 
lifting of the weapons embargo.”17  The EU has since delayed its decision and deferred 
the matter to subsequent EU-China summits because of the backlash following the 2005 
                                                 
13 David Shambaugh. Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2005), 254. 
14 Michael Yahuda. “Europe and America in Asia: Different Beds. Same Dreams?” Sigur Center Asia 
Paper no. 18. Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, March 2004, 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 CamillaT. N. Soerensen. “The EU’s Approach toward Relations with Tokyo and Beijing,” China 
Brief vol. 7 no. 9, The Jamestown Foundation (May 2, 2007): 10. 
17 Ibid. 
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Anti-Secession Law and human rights pressures internal to the EU.18  In light of the 2008 
Olympics, Beijing has been intensely sensitive regarding negative media on Darfur issues 
and has subsequently placed diplomatic pressure on the Sudanese government.  On some 
levels the U.S.-China relationship can be called a “strategic rivalry,” while the EU-China 
relationship seems to be finding some way at arriving at a “strategic partnership.”  Could 
China be seeking an opportunity to play the United States and Europe against each other?  
China’s rise in military power, economic might, and increased political influence have 
raised suspicions over its true intentions.  Some would argue that China is pursuing a 
“peaceful rise” and that “the China-EU relationship should not be built at the expense of 
either’s relationship with the United States.”19  Particularly since 2003, Washington has 
closely watched growth of the Brussels-Beijing relationship and lobbied hard to maintain 
the status-quo on the EU arms embargo.  The fruit of this “honeymoon” will be critical 
given the strong mutual economic trade interest shared by Europe and China, but also the 
deep divide over the embargo, human rights, fair market competition, and stability in 
Taiwan Strait. 
D. METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, AND SYNOPSIS 
1. Methodology 
In analyzing the triangular relationship among the United States, Europe, and 
China, three comparative case studies focus on the bilateral relationships between U.S.-
EU, China-EU, and China-U.S..  Each case study assesses the effects of security issues, 
human rights, and trade concerns as they pertain to the EU arms embargo and the 
realization of a strategic partnership between China and Europe.  The dependent variable 
is the quality or status of the EU arms embargo.  Independent variables affecting the 
strength of that relationship include security issues, human rights, and trade concerns. 
                                                 
18 CamillaT. N. Soerensen. “The EU’s Approach toward Relations with Tokyo and Beijing,” China 
Brief vol. 7 no. 9, The Jamestown Foundation (May 2, 2007): 10. 
19 Stanley Crossick. “Whither the EU-China Strategic Partnership?” Chinese Institute of International 
Studies no. 4 (Winter 2006), 22, http://www.ec-an.eu/files/Whither_the_eu_china_strategic_partnership.pdf 
(accessed May 29, 2007). 
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Figure 1.   Independent and dependent variables 
 
2. Sources 
Various primary and secondary sources are used in this thesis, including: 
academic literature, press reports, political commentary, unclassified intelligence, and 
trade reports.  Secondary sources consist mainly of reports by the Congressional 
Research Service and by think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the Heritage 
Foundation, the RAND Corporation, and some European and Chinese counterparts.  
Whenever possible, secondary sources are traced to the original source.  These sources 
support the individual case studies and the hypothesis. 
3. Thesis Synopsis and Summary of Findings 
This thesis hypothesizes that since 2001, American strategic and economic 
interests have been increasingly affected by Chinese and European attempts to realize a 
strategic partnership.  In what is now known as a triangular relationship (among the 
United States, Europe, and China), China and Europe have indicated a desire to 
counterbalance against the United States.  The expressed desire to establish 
“multipolarity” has changed to “multilateralism” due in large part to American concern 
and pressures on Europe.  China and Europe have for the most part only realized 
economic benefits and trade, but this is due in large part to an active U.S. lobby on 
Europe in order to maintain the embargo.  Additionally, the passage of the 2005 Anti-
Secession Law brought security and human rights issues to the forefront of the embargo 
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debate.  Trade surpluses in China’s favor have also functioned to slow the realization of a 
full partnership, as have the replacement of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder by 
Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, respectively.  This thesis argues that the appropriate 
U.S. foreign policy toward Europe should maintain a heavy focus on the arms embargo, 
human rights, and trade issues.  In other words, the failure of the Sino-European 
partnership to fully come to fruition is due in large part to U.S. efforts, which should 
therefore be maintained. 
E. THE ORIGINS AND DEFINITION OF THE EMBARGO 
Beginning on April 21, 1989 and lasting until early June 1989, massive numbers 
of Chinese protestors rallied in Tiananmen Square to protest government corruption and 
economic policies, which were believed to have caused inflation and unemployment.  
However, the Tiananmen protesters, including the famous, lone, and defiant “tank man,” 
are most often remembered in Western media for their calls for democracy and their 
embrace of the celebrated statue of the “Goddess of Democracy.”  Fearing a threat to its 
grip on power, the government called in military forces and on June 3rd and 4th, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fired on unarmed protestors, killing between several 
hundred and several thousand, according to a broad range of published estimates.  Often 
referred to as the Tiananmen Square protests, the Tiananmen Square massacre, or the 
June-Fourth Movement, this event was witnessed and reported on by foreign media that 
had arrived to cover Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit.  The result was wide-
ranging and harsh criticism of China’s human rights abuses as well as a rekindled 
international desire to isolate it.  The U.S. State Department summarized its position in 
the following statement in 2004 with a rather conservative estimate of the number of 
casualties: “the Chinese army is believed to have killed or injured hundreds of unarmed 
protestors.  To date, no one has been held accountable for the large number of deaths.  
Some protesters are still imprisoned, sentenced on the basis of trials that did not meet 
international standards.”20 
                                                 
20 U.S. Department of State. United States Summarizes EU Arms Embargo against China. 
International Information Programs, Washington, D.C. November 17, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
eap/Archive/2004/Nov/18-585469.html (accessed March 3, 2008). 
  11
In response the European Council, which is comprised of EU member states’ 
heads of government or state, quickly issued the Madrid Declaration on June 27, 1989.  
This statement condemned the Chinese government’s human rights violations and called 
for an EU embargo with the following language: 
The European Council, recalling the declaration of the twelve of June 6, 
strongly condemns the brutal repression taking place in China.  It 
expresses its dismay at the pursuit of executions in spite of all the appeals 
of the international community.  It solemnly requests the Chinese 
authorities to stop the executions and to put an end to the repressive 
actions against those who legitimately claim their democratic rights. 
In the present circumstances, the European Council thinks it necessary to 
adopt the following measures: …interruption by the member states of the 
community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with 
China,21 
Admittedly, the EU has recognized that its Madrid Declaration as a basis for the 
embargo has been essentially symbolic, not legally binding, and subject to vague 
interpretation and enforcement.  Moreover, its ambiguous and minimal wording of “an 
embargo on trade in arms” has been narrowly interpreted by several EU member states to 
specify restrictions on “lethal” items only, while overlooking the broader non-lethal and 
dual-use military applications.  Because of this, the EU also adopted the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998 and often refers to this measure as a “toolbox.”  
According to an EU fact sheet, 
Due to nature of the declaration, the scope of the embargo is not clearly 
defined.  Thus different Member States interpret the embargo on sales of 
arms to China in different ways.  In any case, in assessing applications for 
licenses to export military items not covered by the embargo, national 
authorities have to consider whether the export in question would be 
appropriate on the basis of the criteria laid down in the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms exports.22 
                                                 
21 European Council. EU Declaration on China. Madrid, June 26-27, 1989, http://www.sipri.org/ 
contents/expcon/euchidec.html (accessed March 3, 2008). 
22 European Union. EU Fact Sheet on EU Arms and Dual Use Exports Policy and EU Embargo on 
China. Brussels, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/FACTSHEET_ON_THE_EU_AND 
_CHINA.pdf (accessed March 3, 2008). 
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However, the Code of Conduct, while more “clearly defined” than the Madrid 
Declaration, is voluntary in nature and also somewhat ambiguous a circumstance.  The 
lack of clarity and enforcement capability has essentially left the member states the 
ability to determine for themselves the criteria by which to categorize exports and issue 
export licenses.  The Code of Conduct does, however, increase common transparency of 
sales among EU member states.  In the view of the U.S. Department of State, the Code of 
Conduct “has not deterred the sales of millions of euros of dangerous technology thus 
far.”  Nevertheless, the EU has argued that a strengthened Code of Conduct could 
eventually replace the embargo entirely and be even more effective in its arms control 
capacity than either the embargo or the Code of Conduct have been to date.  In response 
to this argument, the U.S. Department of State, while in support of a strengthened Code 
of Conduct, has called the suggestion to completely replace the embargo with it an 
“inadequate substitution.”23  With regard to the Code of Conduct, Amnesty International 
has called it “weak,” “full of gaps,” and in need of “strengthened wording.”  It further 
explained that “France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom accounted for 
one third of the worldwide arms transfer agreements signed between 1994 and 2001.”  
Moreover, the addition of ten new EU member states on May 1, 2004 (“Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia”) brought the EU some new members responsible for “significant arms 
production and exporting activities.”24 
In contrast to the EU, the United States put into place an embargo that was 
enacted as public law 101-246 and signed on February 16, 1990.  This law was distinct 
from the EU embargo because it covered not only lethal items, which are based on the 
U.S. Munitions List, but also non-lethal and dual-use items considered to be sensitive.25  
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of State. United States Summarizes EU Arms Embargo against China. 
International Information Programs, Washington, D.C. November 17, 2004. http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
eap/Archive/2004/Nov/18-585469.html (accessed March 3, 2008). 
24 Amnesty International. Undermining Global Security: the European Union’s Arms Exports, May 
2004, 1 and 4, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/009/2004/en/dom-ACT300092004en.pdf 
(accessed May 5, 2008). 
25 Daniel Smith. “’Twixt Profit and Principle: Arms for China,” Foreign Policy in Focus, International 
Relations Center, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2005/0502china 
.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 
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However, the president of the United States can waive this law in order to serve the 
interests of national security and if human rights improvements are made; under 
Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton items on the U.S. Munitions List 
and satellite technology were in fact transferred to China.26  According to the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO), since 1990 the United States has sold China 
$350 million worth of items on the U.S. Munitions list, including avionics kits for F-8 
aircraft, four Mk-48 mod 2 torpedoes for tests and evaluations, AN/TPQ-37 counter-
battery artillery locating radars, and production assistance for a large caliber artillery 
plant.27  Officially, the waivers stated that it was in the U.S. national interest to honor 
pre-1989 weapons agreements and “that these deliveries would not significantly 
contribute to China's military capability and closing these cases would improve the 
prospects for gaining further cooperation from China on nonproliferation issues.”  This 
report also cites a waiver for commercial export licenses, which allowed for the sale of 
$312.8 million in satellite and encryption items on the Munitions List.28 
Because of U.S. weapons sales, many in the EU have viewed Washington’s 
opposition to lifting the EU embargo as hypocritical.  Nevertheless, the EU has continued 
to export weapons to China beyond pre-1989 agreements, totaling $300 million in 2002 
and $540 million in 2003.29  Other EU exports to China have included French SA-321 
Super Frelon (Z-8) and AS-365 Dauphin-2 (Z-9) helicopters for anti-submarine and 
ground attack, the French Crotale and Italian Aspide (copied from the U.S. Sparrow) 
                                                 
26 Government Accountability Office. China: U.S. and European Union Arms Sales Since the 1989 
Embargoes. GAO Report, statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and 
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Joint Economic Committee, 
April 28, 1998 (GAO/T-NSAID-98-171). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Daniel Smith. “’Twixt Profit and Principle: Arms for China,” Foreign Policy in Focus, International 
Relations Center, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2005/0502china 
.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 
  14
ship-to-air missile systems, British Searchwater Airborne Early Warning Radar, and 
British and Italian avionics and fire control systems for China’s F-7.30 
While American and EU weapons exports to the China have complicated the 
transatlantic embargo debate, it should be stated that 90 percent of weapons exports to 
China come from Russia and the Middle East.31  Also complicating America’s 
involvement in the embargo debate is the fact that its ally Israel has also supplied 
weapons to China.  While Washington successfully pressured Israel to drop the sale of 
the Phalcon early warning radar system to China, Israel has still shared F-16 technology 
from its cancelled Lavi fighter program in order to help China develop its F-10 fighter; 
furthermore, some “U.S. observers contend Israel sold Patriot missile technology to 
China.”32 
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EMBARGO 
1. American Regional Security Interests 
The alliances and defense commitments of the United States in East Asia remain a 
prominent focus of U.S. national security strategy.  More specifically, the most prominent 
American security arrangements in Asia concern Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  The 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006 states, 
The United States is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout 
East and Southeast Asia.  The region’s stability and prosperity depend on 
our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a 
forward defense posture supporting economic integration through 
expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human 
rights.33 
                                                 
30 Government Accountability Office. China: U.S. and European Union Arms Sales Since the 1989 
Embargoes. GAO Report, statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and 
Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Joint Economic Committee, 
April 28, 1998 (GAO/T-NSAID-98-171). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Daniel Smith. “’Twixt Profit and Principle: Arms for China,” Foreign Policy in Focus, International 
Relations Center, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2005/0502china 
.html (accessed March 1, 2008). 
33 White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006, 40. 
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While the NSS encourages China’s peaceful rise it also gives it a stern warning: 
“China’s leaders must realize, however, that they cannot stay on this peaceful path while 
holding on to old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate concerns throughout the 
region and the world.  These old ways include: Continuing China’s military expansion in 
a non-transparent way.”34  Clearly, Washington has become increasingly concerned that 
Beijing’s massive yet obscure military spending has as its aim offsetting the regional 
military balance of power with the United States and Taiwan.  China has traditionally 
greatly underreported and concealed its defense spending, but has acknowledged an 
increase in spending by 19.86 percent in 2007 and an additional 17.6 percent in 2008.35  
The NSS also expresses concern for about mounting trade imbalances, suggesting that 
domestic consumption in China should offset large-scale exports, and also expresses 
regret about the lack of progress in human rights issues. 
2. Proliferation of Weapons Technology 
The Chinese have no doubt taken note of the surgical precision and overwhelming 
destructive capability of the American armed forces, particularly during the first Gulf 
War, the Kosovo conflict, and in the latest conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; in each of 
those engagements, Russian equipment similar to their own has proven to be outmoded, 
when compared with Western technology.36  In addition, the way in which the United 
States forcefully deployed two carrier battle groups through the Taiwan Strait with 
impunity during the 1995-96 missile crisis also had a dramatic affect on the Chinese 
leadership.  The lesson learned by the Chinese is that they must modernize their military 
forces to counter a high-technology threat and shift from the Soviet-style strategy of mass 
produced, low-technology equipment.  Furthermore, another lesson learned is that only 
from a position of military strength will China be treated with due respect. 
                                                 
34 White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006, 40. 
35 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008. Annual 
Report to Congress, 31. See also Mure Dickie. “China Raises Funds for Military by 17.6%.” Financial 
Times, March 5, 2008. 
36 David C. Gompert, et al. China on the Move, a Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese 
Strategic Policies and their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations. National Defense Research Institute 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005), 39. 
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While China’s ability to project military power within the region remains 
restricted, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that it “has the greatest 
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military 
technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.”37  China’s 
lack of transparency on military matters has understandably caused concern in the United 
States, given the statement purportedly made by Deng Xiaoping: “Observe calmly; 
secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be 
good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”38  In addition, 
Washington has been mindful of China’s frequent and illegal attempts to gain access to 
U.S. weapons and related technology, as evidenced by 400 investigations of such activity 
by China from 2000 to 2006.39  Washington has also been wary of China’s 2005 Anti-
Secession Law, which claimed the right to use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist 
forces…cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China” or if “possibilities for peaceful 
reunification” fail.40 
                                                 
37 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008. Annual 
Report to Congress, I. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Ibid., 37. 
40 Ibid., 41. 
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II. THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA: ISSUES FOR U.S.-EU 
RELATIONS 
A. CENTRAL ELEMENTS 
Overall, this chapter seeks to answer how U.S.-EU relations since 2001 have been 
affected or changed by Chinese and European Union attempts to end the EU arms 
embargo in conjunction with pursuing a Sino-EU strategic partnership.  EU motivations 
for ending the embargo raise further questions concerning security, human rights, and 
trade; but this study considers these other questions only insofar as each directly affects 
the status of the embargo and relations between Washington and Brussels.   
American security interests would be negatively affected if the EU lifted its 
embargo.  Such an action, without an adequate substitution to ensure the qualitative and 
quantitative control of weapons and dual-use technology from Europe to China, would 
alter the regional balances of power that currently exist in Asia.  This action would 
essentially ignore the strategic implications of the potential flashpoint that exists over 
Taiwan.  The economic interests that the EU has in lifting the embargo in terms of 
weapons sales, the export of dual-use technology, and the reduction of trade imbalances 
are enormous.  However, statements and resolutions made by the U.S. Congress have 
been effective instruments of American pressure that have indeed affected EU decision-
making concerning the embargo.  Furthermore, the importance of human rights within the 
EU has risen, weakened the resolve to lift the embargo, and recast such attempts to do so 
as unprincipled.  In 2005, U.S.-EU relations were strained by the American perception 
that attempts by EU governments to lift the embargo constituted evidence of 
counterbalancing by China and the EU against the United States.  Since that time, a lack 
of EU consensus in lifting the embargo reaffirmed the value that the EU places in strong 
transatlantic relations.  However, continued efforts to support lifting the embargo by 
some EU member states appear as shortsighted and unscrupulous efforts to obtain 
financial gains without considering long-term strategic implications. 
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B. A CASE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
The U.S.-EU debate about the embargo is largely symbolic of the character of 
recent tensions in the transatlantic relationship.  Since 2005 the EU has been disappointed 
by China’s lack of progress in ratifying the UN’s 1976 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (as promised in 1998) and its “extensive use of the death penalty, re-
education through labor, limits on freedom of expression, religion, and association, and 
the rights of ethnic minorities in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang.”41  In that respect, in 
March and April 2008 the well-publicized deaths of between 18 and up to more than 100 
demonstrators (according to a broad range of published estimates), during China’s 
suppression of Tibetan protests, have not helped the Chinese cause internationally.  
According to David Shambaugh’s analysis of attempts to lift the embargo, “The manner 
in which the EU Commission and Council (mis)handled the arms embargo issue, creating 
an intra-European and transatlantic policy fiasco, only emboldened the critics of Brussels' 
China policy.”42  Lifting the EU arms embargo is still on the EU agenda, though little 
movement has been made to that end, because a full consensus among the EU must be 
achieved in order to do so.43  During the most recent China-EU summit in November 
2007, the issue was not substantively addressed.  However, demands for its removal by 
individual EU member states remain prominent and quite vocal.  Nevertheless, the EU is 
China’s “largest supplier of equipment and technology”44 even while the embargo 
remains in place.  The embargo is in fact decidedly vague in its restrictive capacity.  
Because of American and Japanese pressure and human rights concerns within the EU, 
                                                 
41 Robin Niblett. “The United States, the European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China,” 
Euro-Focus, vol. 10, no. 3, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 30, 2004, 
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42 David Shambaugh. “China-Europe Relations Get Complicated,” Brookings Northeast Commentary, 
The Brookings Institution, May 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/05china_shambaugh.aspx 
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43 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008. Annual 
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44 David Shambaugh. speech on “The European-China Engagement: Implications for the United 
States,” as part of the Southeast Roundtable on Defense (SEROD), http://www.cistp.gatech.edu/cistp/ 
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EU institutional actions regarding the embargo have amounted to little more than 
declarations of an intent to lift it at some unspecified future date. 
Leaders also discussed the EU arms embargo.  The Chinese side reiterated 
its view that lifting the arms embargo would be conducive to the sound 
development of the EU-China relations and urged the EU to lift the arms 
embargo at an early date.  The EU side recognized the importance of this 
issue and confirmed its willingness to carry forward work towards lifting 
the embargo on the basis of the Joint Statement of the 2004 EU-China 
Summit and subsequent European Council Conclusions.45  -Joint 
Statement of the 10th EU-China Summit, Beijing, November 28, 2007. 
In no uncertain terms, President Bush has expressed “deep concern” to the EU 
over the proposal to lift the embargo and has stated that the transfer of military 
technology “would change the balance of relations between China and Taiwan.”46  
Furthermore, Senator Lugar, then the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
expressed concern in 2005 about the implications of lifting the embargo for transatlantic 
relations, but also stated, “if the quantity or quality of arms flowing to China from Europe 
rises markedly, we should reassess sales to Europe of our most critical military 
technology.”47  The U.S. Senate has also called for the maintenance of the embargo and a 
strengthened Code of Conduct on European arms sales; in its current form, adherence to 
the Code of Conduct is purely voluntary.  “Because many EU member states have 
narrowly interpreted the arms embargo as banning only lethal weapons, some EU 
countries have sold defense-related technology to China.”48  Reinforcement via a 
strengthened Code of Conduct is therefore necessary to make the weapons embargo 
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effectual.  Additionally, with uncommon bipartisanship in a vote of 411 to 3, the U.S. 
House of Representatives passed Resolution 57 and thereby resolved that the House of 
Representatives  
…deplores the recent increase in arms sales by member states of the 
European Union (EU) to the People's Republic of China and the European 
Council’s decision to finalize work toward lifting its arms embargo on 
China, actions that place European security policy in direct conflict with 
United States security interests and with the security interests of United 
States friends and allies in the Asia and Pacific region; 
… [and] declares that such a development in European security policy is 
inherently inconsistent with the concept of mutual security interests that 
lies at the heart of United States laws for transatlantic defense cooperation 
at both the governmental and industrial levels and would necessitate 
limitations and constraints in these relationships that would be unwelcome 
on both sides of the Atlantic;49 
C. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU was designed to be a “political system not a state” in the traditional sense.  
This is to say that in terms of power and decision-making it relies on the willing 
consensus of its members rather than a Weberian-model of a “monopoly on the legitimate 
use of coercion.”50  The manner and process in which the EU makes policy decisions is 
quite complex and time-consuming.  However, in general terms, it is helpful to 
understand the basic institutional structures.  The European Commission is the EU’s 
executive arm, responsible for drafting new policy proposals.  It is composed of 27 
Commissioners, which represent each member state and are appointed by the European 
Council.  The European Parliament (EP) is the legislative arm of the EU and directly 
represents the people of the EU because the MEPs are the only officials who are directly 
elected to serve in the EU.  Elections are held every five years and determine the 
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50 A quotation from the author in his paraphrasing of Max Weber, which he is using to contrast with a 
description of the EU political system, Simon Hix. The Political System of the European Union (New York, 
NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 4. 
  21
composition of the 785-member Parliament.  The Parliament provides “democratic 
supervision” over EU institutions, but laws are often passed through “codecision” with 
the European Council, or through consultation or cooperation.51  The EP’s legislative 
power is quite limited and its real power rests through controlling the budget and to some 
degree through its power to censure the Commission.  The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) holds judicial authority, though it has “restricted” powers of judicial review.52  In 
contrast with all other EU institutions, the vast majority of power (executive and 
legislative) rests with the European Council.  It is composed of Ministers from each 
member state and directly represents each as a respective head of government.  As such, 
each is therefore fully “empowered to commit his or her government.”  Although a single 
Council Minister represents each member state, his or her vote is weighted according to 
respective domestic population size.  The key responsibilities of the Council include: 
To pass European laws – jointly with the European Parliament in many 
policy areas. 
To co-ordinate the broad economic policies of the member states. 
To conclude international agreements between the EU and other countries 
or international organizations. 
To approve the EU’s budget, jointly with the European Parliament. 
To develop the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), based 
on guidelines set by the European Council. 
To co-ordinate co-operation between the national courts and police forces 
in criminal matters.53 
With regard to relations with China and the status of the arms embargo, the 
Council holds the most power and relevance, particularly because it determines economic 
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policies and international agreements.  “The Council undertakes both executive and 
legislative functions: it sets the medium and long-term agenda, and is the dominant 




Figure 2.   EU Codecision Diagram, showing proposal and approval processes and more 
importantly the comparative power of the Council55 
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D. ISSUES WEAKENING THE EMBARGO: COMMERCIAL AND 
POLITICAL  INCENTIVES 
1. A Strategic Partnership among Equals 
China has openly proclaimed its desire to be treated and respected as an equal as 
well as its commitment to the principles of noninterference in internal affairs.  Many 
observers of the Sino-EU partnership have suggested that China views the EU as a 
critical “counterweight” to the United States and a means to develop a “multipolar 
alternative to a U.S.-centric unipolar world.”56  In fact, the second sentence in China’s 
2003 EU Policy Paper mentions a “world trend toward multipolarity.”57  However, EU 
and Chinese think-tanks have countered that the term “strategic” in this particular 
partnership goes beyond a traditional military connotation, and instead is intended to 
“encompass a comprehensive partnership including economic and trade relations, civil 
society exchanges, political relations, etc.”  Additionally, these institutions have 
downplayed the intent to counterbalance the United States, by recognizing the importance 
of a close transatlantic relationship.58  China and some EU members (France in 
particular) have often called for outright multipolarity or a multipolar world through a 
rise in influence of both the EU and China within the international system.  In this regard, 
Chinese scholars have recognized similar desires for multipolarity in Europe and in 
China: 
Expressed on many occasions by President Chirac, France is in favor of a 
multipolar world, because it would be ‘dangerous’ if the world were to be 
dominated by only one power.  Former German Chancellor Schmidt also 
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by the USA.   In words of Zhengde Huo, ‘there exists a structural conflict 
between the rise of Europe and the efforts of the US to maintain a unipolar 
world’.59 
Although striving for multipolarity is admittedly in “conflict” with the 
preeminence of American power and many in Washington recognize it as such, both the 
EU and China continue to emphasize the need for strong ties with the United States and 
have been actively pursuing improvements in bilateral relations with Washington.60  
Although somewhat perplexing from an American perspective, from a Sino-EU 
perspective, seeking multipolarity while maintaining strong ties with the United States is 
not at all a contradiction, but an improvement upon the current triangular relationship.  In 
2003 at the Fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing 
formally addressed his colleagues with the words “Both being major international forces 
making for world multipolarization, Asia and Europe share broad consensus on many 
important world issues.”61  At a June 2007 meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy, Hu Jintao said 
that France and China “uphold and are committed to promoting world multipolarity and 
maintaining diversity of civilizations.”62  In a January 2008 speech to the Diplomatic 
Corps, Nicolas Sarkozy expressed his positive interpretation of contemporary 
multipolarity with regard to the EU and China, 
We have left behind us the simple certainties of the bipolar world, stable 
but unjust, that imposed its law on us between 1945 and 1990.  We are no 
longer even in the unipolar world that began to emerge between 1991 and 
2001.  Words that rang true just a few years ago, such as “hyper-power,” 
no longer apply today.  For the next three of four decades, probably, we 
have entered an era of relative power.  The economic and political 
emergence of China, India and Brazil, and Russia’s return, are creating 
objective conditions for a new concert of the great powers, of a multipolar 
                                                 
59 Jing Men. “Chinese Perceptions of the European Union: A Review of Leading Chinese Journals,” 
European Law Journal, vol. 12, no. 6 (November 2006): 798. 
60 Ibid., 790. 
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Intervention by Chinese Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing at the Fifth ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting, speech by the Minister, Bali, July 24, 
2003, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2461/t22669.htm (accessed May 7, 2007). 
62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Chinese President Hu Jintao Meets 
with His French Counterpart Sarkozy, official news release, June 9, 2007, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ 
topics/ceupp/t27708.htm (accessed May 5, 2007). 
  25
world in which the European Union could progressively come to be one of 
the most active poles, if it has the will to do so.63 
2. EU Trade Imbalances 
The EU has a strong economic interest in lifting the embargo.  In particular, 
France, Germany, the UK, and Italy have strong economic interests in broadening sales in 
defense markets to China.  Mounting trade imbalances in China’s favor have strained the 
Sino-EU relationship recently, especially in Spain and Italy, which have been most 
threatened by low-cost Chinese imports in textiles.  From this perspective, lifting the 
embargo would benefit both China and the EU, because doing so would help to alleviate 
trade imbalances; the Chinese have not surprisingly often been quick to suggest this as a 
means to ease concerns over trade. 
E. ISSUES PERPETUATING THE EMBARGO: POLITICAL PRESSURE 
1. American Pressure on the EU 
The Chinese have recognized that a significant “gap” exists between EU and U.S. 
China policies.  Additionally, the Chinese believe that “interference” on the part of the 
United States has “complicated” an otherwise improving Sino-EU relationship as well as 
efforts to lift the embargo.64  Certainly, the EU underestimated the magnitude of 
American resistance to lifting the EU embargo, but American pressure alone did not halt 
the efforts.  While most EU leaders predicted that the embargo would be lifted in early 
2005, it was most likely American and Japanese influence that raised awareness and 
increased debate among EU members.  Though a healthy transatlantic relationship is 
quite important among EU members, rising concerns about trade imbalances, an 
undervalued Chinese currency, security concerns in the Taiwan Strait, and a lack of 
improvements in human rights all helped to stall diplomatic efforts to lift the embargo. 
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2. Strong Adherence to Human Rights Principles within the EU  
Chinese sources have acknowledged that American and EU views on the 
promotion of human rights are largely similar based on the 2005 Joint Statement by the 
European Union and the United States: Working Together to Promote Democracy and 
Support Freedom, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Worldwide.  The Chinese also hold 
that Brussels and Washington “make irresponsible remarks on China’s human rights 
issues and legal system construction.”65  Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that this joint 
EU-U.S. declaration was made on June 20, 2005, which was not long after the 
promulgation of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law as well as the EU decision to 
delay lifting the embargo.  It is also noteworthy that the common transatlantic partnership 
within NATO was invoked in this joint EU-U.S. statement. 
Democracy is not just a matter of elections; it must be anchored in 
democratic institutions, separation of powers, human rights, the rule of 
law, tolerance, good governance, and justice.  Our assistance to third 
countries increasingly takes into account the need to sustain democracy in 
all these dimensions.  We have worked closely to create a Europe whole, 
free, and at peace; both the EU and NATO have played an important part 
in this, and continue to do so.66 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In summary, each political entity has learned effective approaches in dealing with 
others.  Since difficulties in lifting the embargo arose, Beijing has realized that the EU 
does not speak with one “voice.”  Instead, good relationships must be forged with 
individual member states bilaterally before realizing tangible improvements in the 
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relationship with the EU as a whole.67  Equally important, a strengthened China-EU 
partnership must not come at the expense of a weakened EU-U.S. relationship.  In other 
words, Beijing has learned that it is more effective to promote trade and investment 
relationships on a bilateral basis with member states, while pursuing trade policy 
concerns on a multilateral basis with the EU.68  EU leaders have recognized that 
increased trade with China has become problematic and appear to be withholding full 
diplomatic force in lifting the embargo until tangible improvements in human rights have 
been made by China.  Additionally, Brussels has recognized that Washington wishes to 
see a strengthened Code of Conduct but appears to be withholding that as a concession to 
Washington in return for Washington’s eventual support in lifting the embargo.  
Washington has learned that lack of progress in China on human rights as well as 
Beijing’s willingness to use force on Taiwan have been effective and divisive issues in 
splitting EU member states with regard to lifting the embargo. 
Clearly, Washington perceives that the lifting of the EU arms embargo would 
negatively impact the regional balances of power.  EU defense industries would have 
much to gain from lucrative sales to China and both China and EU would benefit from 
better trade relations by way of diminished trade surpluses favoring China.  Pressure from 
Washington on the EU has been particularly effective given the strong historic ties within 
the transatlantic relationship.  Since 2005, Washington’s concerns over the embargo have 
largely diminished given the apparent lack of consensus within the EU and heightened 
awareness on human rights matters concerning China.  Furthermore, current EU leaders 
are keen on maintaining positive relations with Washington, while increasingly less 
optimistic concerning expectations of China. 
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III. THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA: ISSUES FOR CHINA-
EU RELATIONS 
European Union leaders are facing difficult decisions on an appropriate policy 
toward China.  The large and rapidly growing Chinese economy, mounting trade 
imbalances in China’s favor and domestic perceptions of an undervalued Renminbi have 
caused strong apprehension among policymakers who have searched for suitable policies.  
However, China’s massive markets also offer enormous potential gain for European 
Union corporations, and are much too large and lucrative to be ignored or isolated.  
Further complicating the pursuit of a satisfactory relationship with China has been a lack 
of Chinese political reform, in conjunction with China’s involvement in weapons 
proliferation, and human rights abuses.  The implications for the European Union’s 
interests in China’s rise mired in security issues, human rights, and trade concerns.  A 
central issue—and sticking point—in the Sino-European Union relationship has been the 
EU arms embargo.  Although many EU member governments have called for lifting the 
embargo, their efforts to lift it have currently stalled largely because of a moral desire to 
gain improvements in China’s respect for human rights prior to lifting the embargo rather 
than just lifting it without any political improvements.  Certainly, individual EU states 
have gained lucrative Chinese contracts after official visits in which they made bilateral 
calls for ending the embargo, but the EU collectively has not ended the embargo.  
Furthermore, the Chinese view the embargo as a relic of the Cold War and an 
impediment to China’s recognition as an equal partner.69  Officially, the EU has 
summarized its “China Policy” with the following statements: 
To engage China further, both bilaterally and on the world stage, through 
an upgraded political dialogue; 
To support China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of 
law and respect for human rights; 
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To encourage the integration of China in the world economy by bringing it 
fully into the world trading system, and supporting the process of 
economic and social reform that is continuing in China and; 
To raise the EU’s profile in China.70 
Similarly, China has summarized its “EU policy” with these statements: 
China attaches importance to the role and influence of the EU in regional 
and international affairs.  History proves that the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and the European Economic 
Community in 1975 has served the interests of both sides.  Despite their 
twists and turns, China-EU relations as a whole have been growing 
stronger and more mature and are now on the track of a comprehensive 
and sound development. 
There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and 
neither side poses a threat to the other.  However, given their differences 
in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic 
development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or 
even disagree on some issues.  Nevertheless, China-EU relations of mutual 
trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides 
address their disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.71 
A. CENTRAL ELEMENTS 
Overall, this chapter seeks to answer how Chinese-EU relations since 2001 have 
been affected by attempts to end the EU arms embargo in conjunction with pursuing a 
strategic partnership.  In lifting the EU arms embargo, further questions concerning 
security, human rights, and trade arise, but this study considers these other questions only 
insofar as each directly affects the status of the embargo and relations between Beijing 
and Brussels. 
In the context of the embargo debates, Chinese officials have denied the need for 
weapons imports from the EU.  However, it is readily apparent from the observation of 
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PLA modernization programs that this is clearly not the case.  PLA reforms plainly 
indicate the trend toward restructuring and acquisition of high technology military 
hardware and dual-use items.  Concurrently, EU defense industries have some of the 
world’s finest and modern technologies that would enable China to fight and defend 
against future high-technology adversaries.  Furthermore, military sales from Europe 
would help to lessen the trade imbalances that EU officials have referred to as 
unsustainable.  More importantly for the Chinese, the embargo remains an impediment in 
China’s quest to be a respected partner in a normalized relationship with the EU. 
China’s ratification of the 2005 Anti-Secession law and its failure to address 
human rights concerns by ratifying the UN International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, as promised in 1998, have been critical factors in perpetuating the 
embargo.  Furthermore, the continued imprisonment of Tiananmen Square protesters has 
sustained human rights as a vivid concern in the European Union.  Ironically, the original 
intent of the proclaimed EU-China strategic partnership and efforts to lift the embargo 
were meant to strengthen EU-China ties.  However, as an unintended consequence, 
stalled efforts to lift the embargo have instead strained relations and prevented the 
realization of a true strategic partnership.  As evidence, when comparing the annual EU-
China summits of 2003 and 2004 to subsequent summits, the strained relationships are 
unmistakable in less friendly tones, repeated requests for reforms, and lowered 
expectations for ensuing outcomes.  As a result, the Sino-EU debate about the embargo is 
largely symbolic of the character of recent tensions and the stalled realization of a 
meaningful strategic partnership. 
B. CHINA-EU TRADE RELATIONS 
On March 2007, world headlines reported that in 2006 China displaced the United 
States as the single, largest source of exports to the European Union.  In other words, 
China and Europe have now become each other’s largest trading partners and have 
moved much closer together since the adoption of annual EU-China summits in 1998.  
Since that time, imports from China to the European Union rose 21 percent, while 
imports from the United States rose by only eight percent, despite a weakening U.S. 
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dollar.72  Similarly, EU exports to China rose by 23 percent, despite a strengthening Euro 
and worries about “export competitiveness.”73  Currently, the growth of Chinese imports 
into the EU is attributed to such things as mechanical and electrical machinery.  To the 
dismay of many Europeans, the trend has indicated that the ‘value curve’ on imports has 
become higher because of high-technology imports.  In other words, Europe has 
benefited by the importation of low cost items, but because of increases in technology, 
the Chinese will become more competitive within European business sectors.  
Additionally, Chinese and European discussions of developing a “strategic partnership,” 
striving toward “multipolarity,” and ending the EU arms embargo, have caused some 
alarm in the United States particularly since 2004.  The strategy of the PRC has been to 
grow economically and militarily, in order to counter efforts by the hegemonic United 
States to contain it.  As such, the intent of the PRC government has been “to improve 
economic ties and acquire advanced technology from other leading nations of the world,” 
which most notably are located in Europe.74 
While increased ties in economic and trade related issues have caused Beijing and 
Brussels to move closer together, in many ways their relationship has recently become 
more challenging due to unresolved issues such as trade deficits in China’s favor, 
accusations of dumping practices, and the EU arms embargo.  The resilience of the arms 
embargo is due in large measure to unresolved human rights issues.  Although the sale of 
weapons and high technology dual-use items would certainly benefit both European 
defense industries and the PLA, the impasse in negotiations to lift the ban not only 
reflects the high value Europeans place on human rights, but also with a strong 
relationship with the United States.  Although actively debated, the ban remains symbolic 
of an EU-China political-economic relationship that has gained strength, been strained, 
and yet has tremendous unrealized potential for mutual benefit. 
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1. Important EU Trading Partners with China 
Since China’s reform under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, trade between Europe and 
China has increased forty times the original amount.  While China has rapidly dominated 
European markets in textiles and the production of clothing, the EU has become “the 
largest foreign supplier of technology and equipment to China, and one of the top foreign 
direct investors in China.”75  According to the latest statistics from the World Bank, the 
CIA, and the WTO, in world standings, China ranks fourth in GDP, second in PPP-GDP, 
and third in trade, exports, imports, and FDI.76  Additionally, its population of 1.3 billion 
people and economic growth rate of 9.9 percent make it impossible to ignore.  The allure 
of China’s purchasing power has created political inroads as well.  For example, after 
Prime Minister Wen Jiaboa visited France in December 2005, contracts were signed for 
“150 A320 Airbuses (worth 9 billion euros), a telecommunications satellite from Alcatel 
(worth 140 million), an agreement with Eurocopter for the joint development of 
helicopters (worth 300 million), and a financial protocol for the construction of high-
speed rail systems (worth 150 million).”  Similarly, in November 2005, President Hu 
Jintao visited Germany and agreed to purchase “60 trans-rapid trains (worth two 
billion).”77  France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have pursued contracts with 
China by using large-scale contracts and heads of state to facilitate the dialogue.  In 
contrast, other states such as Italy and Spain have secured business contracts at lower, 
individual levels.78 
2. Mounting Tensions 
According to EU statistics, between 1980 to 2003 trade from China to the EU 
increased on average by 18 percent annually, while trade from the EU to China increased 
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by 13 percent.79  Economists have predicted that exports from China will continue to 
grow at double digits and the “trade deficit will continue to widen, especially if the Euro 
keeps rising against the Renminbi.  China, in turn, will continue gaining market shares in 
both textiles and electronics.”80  It should be noted that China has had reciprocal 
criticisms of the EU particularly after faltered trade negotiations.  For example, after the 
World Trade Organization Doha talks in March 2007, China’s commerce minister Bo 
Xilai responded to European complaints by saying that the EU impeded negotiations and 
has yet “to make substantial concessions on high import tariffs on farm products, export 
subsidies for agriculture, and the huge domestic support for their agricultural products.”81  
Quite often, the Chinese response to criticisms ranging from environmental concerns to 
currency valuations is that China is a ‘developing nation’ and has done more than should 
be expected of it.  However, in response to international pressures, in July 2005 China 
reversed a policy of fixing the Renminbi to the dollar and allowed it to increase by 2.1 
percent initially and then a “managed float” of .3 and later .5 percent per day in May 
2007.82  China’s large trade surplus with the United States, the EU, and Hong Kong is 
often well publicized; however, China runs large trade deficits with Taiwan, South 
Korea, Japan, and ASEAN as well.83  Nevertheless, tensions in Europe and those most 
affected, France and Germany, have raised dramatically because of rapid trade surpluses 
in China’s favor. 
In July 2007, it was reported that Nicolas Sarkozy said he had a “problem” with 
the valuation of the Renminbi and pushed “for a more assertive European Union 
exchange-rate policy toward China this autumn to try to shore up ailing exporters hit by 
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the strong euro.”84  However, EU monetary officials have urged a softer rhetoric, saying 
“We have to convince them [China] of the responsibility they bear in the international 
monetary framework, but there is no way you can pressure them.”85  Mr. Sarkozy’s tough 
stance on China has had some similarity with American positions, but overall are not 
inline with the less assertive EU.  By comparison, the United States House and Senate 
have “introduced legislation aimed at punishing China for unfair manipulation of its 
currency,” which they argue has led to a $232.5 billion trade deficit and “the loss of 
American manufacturing jobs.”86 
From the Chinese perspective, achieving Market Economy Status (MES) from the 
EU is a vital issue.  Immediately following China’s 2001 entry into the WTO, it was 
relegated to a non-market economy status for a period of fifteen years.  For China, 
“political prestige” and recognition “as an equal partner with the EU” is of vital 
importance particularly since Russia was granted MES even though it had neither joined 
the WTO nor liberalized its economy.87  Ironically, the fact that the EU expanded 
membership in the former eastern bloc has in many ways “obscured the impact of 
China’s rise” because cheap labor and outsourcing complaints has been directed toward 
the eastern members of the EU.88 
3. Protectionist Sentiments 
The debate within the EU concerning China’s status as an economic ‘threat’ or 
‘opportunity,’ has deepened.  Considering the broad economic diversity and comparative 
advantages within the EU, trade with an emerging China has been a mixture of economic 
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benefits and relative costs.  In January 2005, a Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) on Chinese 
textiles removed EU tariffs and quotas, but was “partly reintroduced in July 2005 
following protectionist protests across Europe” particularly in France and Italy.89  In June 
2007, the EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, claimed the current increase of 75 
percent in the trade surplus was “unsustainable” and said he would “demand action” from 
China’s commerce minister, Bo Xilai.90  Mr. Mandelson complained that the Chinese 
have unfairly protected their domestic services by prohibiting foreign competition, done 
little to combat piracy, overproduced and dumped steel on the market, and undervalued 
their currency, while doing little to remove the generous incentives on exportation.91  He 
went further by warning that “mounting protectionist pressures” were building in the steel 
and textile markets in Europe and that China and the EU were at a “crossroads,” which 
may require action from the WTO including “anti-dumping tariffs.”92  Certainly, the 
Chinese could make counter-criticisms of the EU in particular by calling attention to the 
fact that on September 20, 2007 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) criticized the EU, particularly France, Germany, and Spain, for 
“trade and investment protectionism” and limiting the realization of a single market, 
competition, and increased standards of living.93 
4. Domestic Political and Economic Concerns in China and Europe 
Currently, China faces an inflationary crisis that has put political and economic 
concerns in opposition.  Its economy has faced serious inflationary pressures and rising 
prices.  However, the government has been somewhat reluctant to raise interest rates 
because “past steps to control inflation caused social protests and deadly unrest.”94  
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Because of “heightened international sensitivity,” the 2008 Olympics, severe criticism 
from the United States and the EU, and a potentially embittered populace, Beijing’s 
political leadership faces difficult decisions.95  In July 2007, food prices rose by 15 
percent and pork prices rose by 90 percent.96  Adding to inflationary pressures, are 
worldwide surges in grain prices and most recently a Chinese ban on the importation of 
American pork, ironically for containing banned additives.  On September 19, 2007, the 
PRC responded to the decade-high interest rates of 6.5 percent in August, by instituting 
price freezes on all government controlled items.  The response was tied in many ways to 
popular dissatisfaction with inflation and also to the selection of new Communist party 
members in October 2007.97 
In Europe, blaming trade surpluses on China has been counterproductive and not 
all together fair.  First, an undervalued yuan has actually increased the standards of living 
in Europe, as it has in the United States; penalizing the Chinese would only serve to raise 
the cost of items in Europe with the protection of relatively few jobs in comparison.  
Second, Europe’s problems are largely independent of trade relationships with China.  
The EU has already admitted to failing to meet targets of full employment and 3 percent 
growth between 2000 and 2010 because of an “economic malaise,” “social turmoil” 
including riots, poor growth, powerful labor interests, low public confidence, problems 
with a strong unified currency, and governments that “continue to dogmatically defend 
the European social model against global competition.”98 
In December 2006, the European Council ratified a Communication to Beijing 
with a long list of “requests” that many analysts have judged to be quite stern and may 
signal a new phase in the EU-China relationship; a “honeymoon” has now become a 
“marriage.”  The list requests that China: “open its markets and ensure fair market 
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competition;” “reduce and eliminate trade and non-tariff barriers;” “level the 
[commercial] playing field;” “fully implement WTO obligations;” “better protect 
intellectual property rights;” “end forced technology transfers;” “stop granting prohibited 
subsidies;” “work on clean energy technologies;” “be a more active and responsible 
energy partner;” and “better protect human rights.”99 
5. Trade Relations Summary 
From Europe’s perspective, trade with China has been a ‘threat’ to some business 
sectors but also an ‘opportunity’ for others.  Economic troubles in Europe including high 
unemployment and trade surpluses with China, have raised domestic political pressures in 
Europe and induced some alarmist sentiments.  In response, discussions in Europe 
regarding punitive measures have increased and cooled the relationship somewhat, but 
economically the current trends will likely continue.  In a great irony, the European 
Union has recently been accused to protectionism in trade and investment, so its 
criticisms of China can be viewed as hypocritical and therefore less likely to have the 
intended effect. 
C. ISSUES WEAKENING THE EMBARGO: COMMERCIAL AND 
POLITICAL INCENTIVES 
1. EU Weapons Sales 
EU proponents of lifting the EU arms embargo wish to replace it with a 
strengthened Code of Conduct and have argued that it is necessary to engage China in 
active dialogue as a respected partner.  Furthermore, they argue that because of China’s 
growing economy and regional strength, it is critical to ensure greater cooperation with 
UN Security Council resolutions such as those concerning North Korea and Darfur.  They 
have also argued that the embargo has done little to prevent the transfer of weapons-
related items to China and that China has developed its own defense industries or 
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purchased weapons from Russia or the Middle East.  Proponents of lifting the embargo 
also reason, “if the West sells the weapons to Beijing, it can at least keep track of 
developments and try to exercise some control over supply.”100  In fact, the EU has often 
argued that a revised Code of Conduct would be more effective than the EU arms 
embargo is currently.  Proponents of lifting it have claimed that the embargo is largely 
symbolic, but that it does have the harmful effect of embarrassing China and therefore 
needlessly dampening Sino-EU ties. 
2. Chinese Desire for Imports from Europe 
a. Security: Military Applications 
In terms of the EU arms embargo, China’s EU Policy Paper plainly sets 
forth the following request of the EU, “The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China 
at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense 
industry and technologies.”  Presumably, China has hoped to reduce EU concerns about 
the possibility of proliferation on EU weapons and technology from the EU to China and 
eventually to third parties with its assurances of a joint safeguard on “international arms 
control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.”  Naturally and not surprisingly, 
China clearly requested that the EU not “sell to Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, 
materials or technology that can be used for military purposes.”101 
b. Trade: Addressing EU Concerns over Trade Imbalances 
The EU replaced the United States as China’s largest trading partner in 
2006 and as a consequence EU-China relations have, like U.S.-China relations, also 
become more strained because of trade deficits and common concerns over an 
undervalued Renminbi.102  Such concerns in the EU and the United States have increased 
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political pressures for domestic protectionism, unless China acts to revalue its currency 
and reduce its unnecessary customs barriers.  When the EU trade commissioner, Peter 
Mandelson, called the trade deficit “unsustainable,” he was referring to the increase of 73 
percent over the previous year.  Additionally, he used the opportunity to declare that EU-
China trade relations were “at a crossroads.”103  Some estimates have placed the 2007 
trade surpluses at ten times the level in 2004, which is further evidenced by China’s more 
than $1.2 trillion in foreign currency reserves.104 
China has similarly learned to return criticism toward the EU and the 
United States on trade issues, as evidenced by its complaints about a WTO blockage 
during the 2007 Doha talks.  At those discussions, Bo Xilai, China’s commerce minister, 
said that “As the world’s two largest traders, (they) have yet to make substantial 
concessions on high import tariffs on farm products, export subsidies for agriculture and 
the huge domestic support for their agricultural products.”  In defending China’s position, 
Bo Xilai used a commonly used tactic, by stating that China is a developing country and 
“has already done more than it should have.”105  China has been known to resist more 
intractably if it perceives heavy foreign pressure, which it recognizes as interference in its 
internal affairs.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that China has acknowledged a 
need to address and help to lessen concerns over its currency valuation.  The reversal of 
its policy of price-fixing to the dollar and institution of a “managed float” “against a 
basket of currencies” signifies reform.106  Ironically, the weakening of the dollar relative 
to both the yuan and the euro, has intensified EU concerns over a properly valued 
currency in China.  The EU has, not surprisingly, called for greater reforms, but further 
complicating China’s willingness to act more aggressively have been the Chinese 
public’s protests over decade high inflation.  Fearing greater domestic political unrest and 
risking increased pressure from the EU, the Chinese government responded in September 
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2007 by instituting price controls on items “ranging from oil, electricity and water to the 
cost of parking and park entrance fees.”107 
3. Chinese Desire for Normalized Relations 
China’s attempts to normalize its relations with world powers are a necessary 
process in order to attain full economic benefit from as many trading partners as possible.  
As often stated by Deng Xiaoping, the principal goal of the CCP in ensuring the survival 
of its brand of socialism has been to maintain legitimacy through economic reform in 
order to bring about prosperity, enhance political stability domestically, and strengthen 
China’s military power and prestige on the world stage.108 
The highpoint for China-EU relations occurred between 2003 and 2004, because 
strong bilateral ties were developed but tensions had not yet come to the fore.  Often 
called the “honeymoon,” this period has several important developments toward strong 
Sino-EU ties.  On September 10, 2003, the European Commission issued its policy paper 
titled A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations.  
In response and just weeks prior to the 6th EU-China Summit, China issued its first ever 
EU Policy Paper on October 13th.  The positive reaction in China was clearly evident 
when the government in China declared 2004 to be the “Year of Europe.”  In March of 
2004, the EU became China’s largest trading partner and China became the EU’s second 
largest trading partner.109 
D. ISSUES PERPETUATING THE EMBARGO: POLITICAL PRESSURE 
Because of a variety of factors including security issues, human rights, trade 
concerns, and political pressure from Washington, Tokyo, and EU constituencies, the EU 
has continued to maintain its embargo.  In December 2005, statements affirming the 
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embargo surprised many observers because this was a stark reversal considering that 
many EU leaders only six months before were most assuredly predicting that the 
embargo would indeed be lifted.  Following bilateral meetings with China in January 
2007, the EU reaffirmed its opposition to lifting the embargo and based its position on 
human rights.  More specifically, it stated that the embargo would remain in place until 
China meets four specific criteria: it must ratify the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), release the Tiananmen Square protesters who remain in jail, 
end the re-education through labor (RTL) system of imprisonment without trial, and ease 
censorship of the media.110 
1. Security: The 2005 Anti-Secession Law 
In 2003, France and Germany led efforts to lift the embargo and were joined 
shortly afterward by Italy, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK.  By late 2004, 
the Taiwan lobby and human rights concerns complicated the debate in the national 
parliaments of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, though each in principle agreed with the 
premise of lifting the embargo.111  Following the March 2005 Anti-Secession law, the 
political momentum in the EU shifted dramatically.  “In the 2005 Annual Report on the 
CFSP, with 431 votes in favor and 85 against, the European Parliament again urged the 
Council not to lift the arms embargo.”  The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
called on the Council “not to lift the arms embargo until greater progress is made in the 
field of human rights and arms exports controls in China and on cross-Strait relations.”112  
While the EP “claims to represent the people of the Europe,” the Council represents the 
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governments of the member states and more importantly in this case maintains the 
capacity for foreign policy decision-making.113 
2. Human Rights Concerns 
Since 1998, the EU has ceased its annual policy of co-sponsoring (with the United 
States) the motion against China in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR).  The EU made the decision to reverse its policy because it believed that the 
action unnecessarily hampered relations with Beijing without a meaningful improvement 
in human rights.114  Instead of a public criticism of China at the UN, the EU chose 
instead to adopt a bilateral approach with China in the European Commission’s 1998 
paper, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China.115  The new policy called for 
biannual EU-China human rights dialogues and was met with receptivity in China.116  
Because EU Annual Reports on Human Rights have both criticized China and offered 
encouragement on some improvements, China has remained engaged with the EU in 
formal dialogues.  However, while China remains engaged in such dialogues with the 
EU, it has levied considerable influence of its own on the subject of human rights. 
Most notably, China has complained vociferously against any leader willing to 
receive the Dalai Lama.  European politicians have tried to mitigate the damage done to 
bilateral ties with China, by meeting with the Dalai Lama.  For example, in September 
2007 German Chancellor Angela Merkel received the Dalai Lama in a government office 
and without prior notification of China.  This action was particularly troubling for China 
given its 2003 EU Policy Paper, which specifically detailed its views on the matter; “The 
Chinese side requests the EU side not to have any contact with the ‘Tibetan government 
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in exile’ or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique.”117  
Suggestive of a measure of discretion and diplomatic courtesy, in March 2008 Gordon 
Brown, the Prime Minister of the UK, gave the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, 
prior notification of his meeting with the Dalai Lama and held the meeting in Lambeth 
Palace, the home of the Archbishop of  Canterbury.  The distinctions were intended to be 
in accordance with the reception of a spiritual leader, rather than a head of state, and 
evidently designed to avoid the punitive damage to bilateral and commercial ties incurred 
by Germany.118 
From 2003 to 2005, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder were the most vocal opponents of the EU arms ban on China.  Since 
that time their successors, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, have reversed course and 
supported the embargo.  However, recent actions by Sarkozy represent yet another 
reversal, now against the ban.  During his electoral campaign, the pro-U.S. and pro-
NATO candidate Sarkozy claimed to be in favor of the embargo and accused China of 
“transforming its insatiable search for raw materials into a strategy of control.”119  
Additionally, Sarkozy professed a desire to add an element of human rights to French 
foreign policy and diplomacy, which may have been intended to distinguish himself from 
his predecessor, who had been accused of “using diplomacy for commercial ends.”120  
Sarkozy also professed, for example, that “just because China and Russia are great 
powers one should not refrain from denouncing the violations of human rights that are 
committed there.”121  Nevertheless, on November 25-27, 2007 Sarkozy made a state visit 
to China and secured the sale of $17 billion in 160 Airbus aircraft and $12 billion in two 
civil nuclear reactors, and unashamedly released a statement in favor of lifting the 
embargo.122  It is also interesting to note that during this visit, just one day before the 
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November 28, 2007 EU-China summit, Sarkozy “conspicuously” neglected “to bring 
along his human rights minister,” Ms. Rama Yade.123  Commenting on this dramatic 
about-face, U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter said, “When they [the French] assume 
the EU presidency [in July 2008], you can bet they’re going to make a push so they can 
deliver a gift to the Chinese during their summit late next year.”124  Hunter was referring 
to the next EU-China summit, which is to take place in November 2008.  In reaction to 
Sarkozy’s April 2008 suggestion that France might boycott the 2008 Olympics 
inauguration in response to China’s treatment of Tibetan protestors, Swedish Minister of 
Parliament Carl B. Hamilton had the following comment concerning French “hypocrisy,” 
“The first lesson is that France holds no scruples but plenty of political flexibility 
regarding business, China, and human rights.  Second, principled resistance and distinct 
protests against China can pay off.  When outspoken demands on human rights become 
too uncomfortable, the Chinese leaders may change their policy.”125 
a. The UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was 
signed by Beijing in October 1998, but it has yet to ratify it.  Ratification in 2005 would 
have been precisely the gesture the EU needed to appease domestic human rights 
concerns.  In fact, the European Council Presidency Conclusions published in February 
2005, directly indicate the importance of the ICCPR on lifting the embargo. 
EU-China relations have developed significantly in all aspects in the past 
years.  It is looking forward to further progress in all areas of this 
relationship as referred to in the EU-China Joint Statement, in particular 
the ratification of the International Covenant on civil and political rights.  
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continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo.  It invited the next 
Presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a 
decision.126 
However, such a step on China’s part would have required more than 
symbolic action, but a fundamental reversal in its legal foundations and treatment of its 
citizens.  Chinese officials have often resisted international conformity in human rights 
standards by citing the importance of “Asian values” and regional diversity.  During the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Chinese foreign minister stated 
that “individuals must put the state’s rights before their own.”127  Deng Xiaoping once 
asked rhetorically, “What are human rights?  They are the rights of how many people, of 
a majority, or a minority, or of all the people?  What the West calls human rights and 
what we call human rights are two different things, with different standpoints.”128 
Among the ICCPR articles, are principles that are universal in the EU.  
China currently allows for the right “to apply for a hearing,” but reform would bring 
about the right to be promptly brought before a court for charges, an “independent and 
impartial tribunal,” the right to an attorney, and the presumption of innocence.129  
Additionally, the articles would seek to protect “freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion…expression, association, and assembly,” and restrict the broad application of the 
death penalty.130  Additionally problematic for China, the articles restrict the use of 
“forced or compulsory labor” and permit the right to “liberty of movement and the 
freedom to choose” a residence.131 
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b. Imprisoned Tiananmen Protesters 
Amnesty International has labeled the killings in June 1989 as 
“executions: deliberate and targeted killings of peaceful demonstrators by government 
forces” who were “unarmed protesters and bystanders who posed no threat to army 
personnel.”132  Additionally the report states that thousands were arrested, sent into exile, 
received long sentences, life in prison or death, and that dozens remain in jail to this 
day.133  This fact remains a political sore spot for EU members favoring a repeal of the 
embargo, and it has been difficult to overlook.  The EU expected China in early 2005, as 
a gesture of good faith, to release those imprisoned, but China inexplicably did not do so.  
In February 2006, international attention was drawn to Yu Dongyue, who served 17 years 
in prison for “counter-revolutionary incitement” by throwing paint on a portrait of Mao 
Zedong.  Likely tortured and held in solitary confinement, Yu, a former journalist, was 
released but has not recognized his own family members and has remained unintelligible 
and despondent.134  Moreover, Chinese citizens have continued to be imprisoned because 
of government attempts to suppress and contain the effects of the Tiananmen Square 
protests.  According to Amnesty International, in 2000, Huang Qi was sentenced to five 
years in prison for posting opinions about the protest on his website; in 2005, Shi Tao 
was sentenced to ten years for providing journalists with official documents concerning 
social unrest during an anniversary of Tiananmen.135 
c. Re-Education through Labor and Media Freedom 
In 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP called for the establishment of 
RTL programs.  Actions punishable under RTL include unrepentant behavior that is 
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counterrevolutionary, anti-socialist, disruptive to public order, and not in compliance 
with rules of the work place, yet not a violation of criminal law.136  In other words, 
persons who are able to work, but refuse to conform to what is considered appropriate 
behavior will be “re-educated” through labor.  The EU and human rights organizations 
have taken exception to the practice of RTL because it concerns state action to force 
compliance with “subjectively assessed behavior” rather than to punish a “crime” or 
“offense” in such a way that is compatible with Article 15 of the ICCPR on the principles 
of “no crime without law” and “no punishment without law.”137  As of 2005, there were 
more than 310 institutions and 100,000 police officers and staff to supervise the more 
than 310,000 people in RTL camps.138 
The Chinese government has traditionally maintained tight control over 
domestic and foreign media.  Although it recently expelled foreign journalists from Tibet, 
China’s limitations on journalists and common forms of media such as newspapers and 
books are not new.  What are new and more restrictive are China’s strong efforts to 
suppress websites and “blogs.”  It is unclear whether this restriction is due to a deliberate 
change in policy or the possibility that it has only recently acquired the technology to 
impose and enforce more restrictions. 
E. THE CURRENT CHARACTER OF SINO-EU RELATIONS AS A RESULT 
OF THE EMBARGO 
When compared with Washington, Brussels has been more willing to “engage” 
Beijing, play down the “China threat,” and attempt to socialize China toward a European-
style view of multilateralism in a post-Westphalian mindset.  It is clear that Washington 
has struggled to maintain a consistent stance on “China’s rise,” and that U.S. policy has 
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shifted between containment, hedging, and ‘comprehensive engagement.’  During the 
Cold War, the EU followed the American lead with regard to its China policy.  However, 
in 1995 the European Commission published its first China strategy paper.  It emphasized 
an EU “approach” toward engagement intended to improve relations with China as a 
trading partner by focusing on improvements in China’s political system and human 
rights, while less preoccupied with “threat theories.”139  Since Tiananmen Square, the 
defining moment in Sino-U.S. relations has been the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis.  The 
defining moment for Sino-EU relations since that time has been the 2005 Anti-Secession 
law.  While the United States and the EU share common views on trade and human rights 
issues, they have entirely different perceptions of security issues and the potential “China 
threat.”  In terms of security, it was the timing of the March 2005 law, which came only 
months before the embargo was to be lifted, which caused the EU to shift ideologically 
from Beijing to Washington.  In this triangular relationship, the relative importance of 
security remains a pivotal factor and it is nowhere more evident than in the debates 
revolving around the embargo. 
1. Current Tensions 
The European Commission’s China Country Strategy Paper (CSP) has 
recognized Sino-American security tensions by stating that “China and the U.S. have 
growing mutual commercial interests, but face difficult political differences over issues 
such as Taiwan, human rights, and U.S. plans for a Nuclear Missile Defense system.  
Tensions between the U.S. as the dominant superpower, and China as a growing military 
and economic power, are likely to occur regularly for the foreseeable future.”140  
Furthermore, in describing Chinese interest in Russian-made weapons the CSP stated, 
“This reflects China’s interest in supporting global multipolarity and resisting perceived 
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U.S. hegemony.  Relations are likely to intensify over the coming years, while tempered 
by historical mistrust.”  Both statements clearly reflect an unambiguous awareness by the 
EU concerning security and the relevance of weapons in the Sino-American relationship.  
The concerns on all sides over Taiwan, weapons, and the regional balances of power are 
obvious.  Within the Sino-EU relationship, both sides want to reduce the trade deficit 
with arms sales, but disagree on the depth of human rights reforms.  Furthermore, neither 
China nor the EU seems particularly keen on angering a potentially retaliatory U.S. 
Congress. 
2. The Future of EU-China Summits 
Although France is poised to assume the EU presidency in July 2008, with 
presumably time to gather support for ending the embargo at the November 2008 EU-
China summit, it will probably not be able to gain a consensus among EU member states 
on the matter.  Due to strong human rights concerns among EU voters, EU leaders have 
shied away from public endorsements of ending the embargo.  French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi are notable exceptions; however, the 
latter received a vote of no confidence in parliament in January 2008.  An EU official 
recently stated, “There is no formal proposal that has been made for it to be lifted and 
there is no formal discussion about it.  There is no reason to change the EU’s opposition 
as set out in Council conclusions of December 2005.”141  However, it should be noted 
that although no “formal proposals” for lifting the embargo exist within the EU, the issue 
is still quite active and very much a matter for discussion.  Despite some statements 
indicating that the issue has not been formally disscussed since 2005, according to an 
October 2006 EU Commission communication to the Council and Parliament, 
The EU has agreed to continue to work towards embargo lift, but further 
work will be necessary by both sides: Current and incoming Presidencies 
should finalize technical preparations to ensure lift would not lead to a 
qualitative or quantitative increase in arms sales, and continue to explore 
possibilities for building a consensus for lift.  The EU should work with 
China to improve the atmosphere for lift, making progress on China’s 
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human rights situation; working to improve cross-straits relations; and by 
improving the transparency of its military expenditure.142 
During its EU presidency in July 2008, France will probably raise the issue for 
official discussion in the EU, despite the great probability of being voted down.  Such 
efforts though unsuccessful will be viewed positively by China.  As a result, France, in 
“Chirac-ian” tradition, will likely gain added favor from the Chinese leaders in 
commercial sales by way of diplomacy.  Chinese leaders have historically been quick to 
provide commercial rewards in return for favorable policies concerning the embargo, 
limited recognition of the Dalai Lama, and a one-China policy with regard to Taiwan.  
For EU leaders, some discussions toward lifting the embargo bring about beneficial 
relations with China, but earnest and active efforts to lift the embargo have been met with 
powerful resistance from Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei.  The EU has not reattempted 
such efforts since early 2005. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The EU has great interests in lifting the embargo.  First, the embargo has been an 
embarrassment to both sides of the Sino-EU relationship.  With increasing trade and 
China as the host to the 2008 Olympics, the embargo remains problematic.  Because 
China holds a permanent seat on the UNSC, the EU foresees great benefit in socializing 
China toward its norms and pursuing common world interests.  Second, increased arms 
sales would have a dramatic and mutually beneficial impact in aiding EU defense 
industries, granting China access to high-technology hardware, and also in reducing the 
trade surplus, that has plagued Sino-EU relations.   
There is no question that the 2005 Anti-Secession law and China’s failure to 
address human rights concerns by ratifying the UN’s ICCPR, releasing Tiananmen 
protestors, reforming RTL, and easing media freedoms have perpetuated the embargo 
from the EU perspective.  China’s failure to satisfy EU concerns, notably with symbolic 
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gestures, reflects Beijing’s priority toward domestic political control above improving 
ties with the EU.  Sino-EU relations have been strained by the failed attempts to lift the 
embargo, particularly since strong sentiments still exist in favor of lifting it, yet no formal 
efforts to compromise have been made in recent years. 
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IV. THE EU ARMS EMBARGO: ISSUES FOR CHINA-U.S. 
RELATIONS 
In more fully understanding China-U.S. relations as they pertain to the embargo, 
it is helpful to first understand some of the drivers of Beijing’s foreign policies, the role 
of the CCP in government, and its economic legacies and reforms.  Additionally, how 
Beijing views the embargo and its attempts to circumvent it will also be analyzed.  
Finally, an analysis of appropriate U.S. policies toward China will make 
recommendations on improving bilateral ties with respect to the embargo and security 
issues such as the Taiwan question as well as human rights and trade concerns.  An 
effective U.S. policy toward China needs to foster American interests in terms of security 
issues, human rights principles, and trade concerns.  Such a policy needs to continue to 
engage China politically and foster deeper ties.  Furthermore, this policy must recognize 
that close EU-China ties will also help to foster political improvements in China and 
socialize China toward new norms of behavior and greater world responsibility befitting a 
member of the UN Security Council.  Such constructive engagement of China on both 
sides of the Atlantic must foster friendly and non-threatening ties, but also have an 
appropriate and true regard for a practical dialogue that will measurably advance human 
rights improvements in China as well as ensure peaceful relations with Taiwan. 
A. UNDERSTANDING BEIJING 
1. The Drivers of Beijing’s Foreign Policies 
Beijing’s foreign policies focus primarily on national interest, but ideology and 
cultural traditions play an important, though secondary role in government.  Ideology and 
cultural traditions cannot be completely discounted because both have been used to 
justify and legitimize the rule of the CCP.  This is evident in the very limited degree to 
which successors to Mao Zedong, like Deng Xiaoping were judicious and sparing in their 
criticisms of Mao or of the Communist Party.  However, foreign policies, since the 
founding of the PRC in 1949, have become increasingly more rational and less 
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ideologically rigid over time.  The CCP did, however promote a period of reform back to 
the traditional ideals of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism after Tiananmen Square incident 
threatened its power and legitimacy; this movement was short-lived and not consistent 
with the broader trend shifting away from ideology toward ‘realpolitik.’  Denny Roy has 
stated that, “China’s foreign relations demonstrates that there is merit in the Realist 
assumption that the moral and ideological concerns are secondary to the desire of states 
to maintain and increase their power relative to other governments.”143 
Historically, China as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ dominated surrounding tributary 
states, looked inward, and was more concerned with border defense than the expansion of 
long-range trade, military modernization, and western learning.  After the ‘century of 
humiliation,’ the realities and brutality associated with national weakness became 
increasingly important.  ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought’ has played a crucial 
role and a basis for fulfillment of the communist revolution, common thought, coherent 
foreign policy, and a new sense of nationalism.  With power relatively more secure 
domestically, ideology has become less critical, though not irrelevant because of its 
usefulness in sustaining political rights to legitimacy.  Since the death of Mao in 1976 
and particularly under the influence of Deng Xiaoping, “emphasis was shifted more 
toward China’s pragmatic economic development.”144  Mao Zedong may have insinuated 
that the PRC would not be narrowly confined to one side of Cold War bipolarity in his 
1949 speech saying, “China would seek to establish relations with all foreign countries on 
the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.”145 
In May 1958, Mao Zedong made clear that in realism, the value of power is quite 
high: “Though we have a large population, we have not yet demonstrated our strength.  
One day when we catch up with Great Britain and the U.S., Dulles will respect us and 
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acknowledge our existence as a nation.”146  Domestically, ideology has great importance, 
but in foreign policy respect, power, and national security reign supreme.  It was Zhou 
Enlai in his 1955 speech and 1971 meetings with Kissinger and Nixon, that promoted the 
value of a ‘friendly’ atmosphere and negotiation in ‘relaxing tension’ not along 
ideological lines but along lines of logical alliance and power balancing. 
China’s foreign policy decisions reflect a broader desire to be respected and 
treated as a great nation.  Power in Confucian society is relative and includes intangible 
things such as respect that do not carry equal relevancy in western thought.  The Nixon-
Kissinger visits, the recognition of the PRC, and a permanent seat at the UN Security 
Council may have all worked to disprove or at least make less relevant the Maoist ideals 
of western persistence on communist subversion.  The warming of relations or 
‘rapprochement’ with the west that took place under Zhou Enlai and later under Deng 
Xiaoping, have permitted the CCP to make Leninist-Marxist-Maoist thought secondary to 
national security and economic advancement.  The Chinese have claimed that ties with 
the United States were increased in the early 1970’s because of a comparative weakness 
of the United States to the USSR.  Clearly, China’s primary interest in power balancing, 
military expansion, nuclear capability, and economic prosperity centered on enhancing 
national security, while limiting intervention by foreigners.  The focus was no longer on 
revolutionary ideas of collective struggle.  Ideology for the Chinese became used less for 
foreign policy decisions and rather interestingly used as a tool to criticize the actions and 
policies of other nations.147  While Mao’s denunciation of Khrushchev’s revisionism 
appears to be based on ideological disputes, the underlying reasons rationally include the 
Chinese desire for autonomy and respect.  Similarly, Chinese support for Albania in 1961 
is more rationally founded in balance-of-power tactics in a zero-sum-game, than in 
ideological alignments. 
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Now that China has close economic and diplomatic relationships with former 
enemies, such as Japan, the United States and South Korea, it is reasonable to project that 
nationalism could eventually replace communist ideology in terms of importance.  Denny 
Roy summarized China’s shift toward realism when stating that, “Neo-Realists expect 
that alliances will be flexible, and that a government will seek security cooperation with 
its neighbors to offset the power of the state or states it considers most threatening.  But 
since today’s ally may be tomorrow’s enemy, ultimately a state can rely only on itself for 
protection; therefore states seek to develop their own capacities to defend their interests, 
and tend to resist the imposition of restrictions on these capabilities.”148  As long as the 
power of the communist party is not directly threatened, as it was during the Tiananmen 
Square incident, the foreign policy actions of the PRC serve to protect the national 
interest and are for the most part rational and unitary. 
Historically, the Asian ideology of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
first espoused by Zhou Enlai and Pandit Nehru in 1954, have proven to be the foundation 
upon which China’s foreign policy rests, (“mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence”).149  However, because of the 
importance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics on international prestige, China has 
uncharacteristically chosen pragmatism over non-interference in sending a delegation to 
Sudan.  This rare effort successfully ‘pressured’ the government of Sudan to accept 
United Nations peacekeepers to augment the existing African Union troop presence.  
Furthermore, the apparent reversal in foreign policy reflects the realization of the 
importance, both domestically and internationally, to a successful hosting of the 
Olympics, rather than a sudden moral awakening.  In future foreign policy decisions, it is 
reasonable to assume that China will pursue the ideals of non-interference when possible, 
but power and the acquisition of natural resources will be the highest priority.  Ironically, 
it is quite often that the Third World and their sorely needed natural resources that are 
attracted to China’s principles of non-interference.  This is to say that the Chinese often 
                                                 
148 Denny Roy. China’s Foreign Relations, (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 4. 
149 Ibid., 40. 
  57
demand little and ask few questions of their trading partners, and this tactic has proven to 
be quite useful.  In all efforts, the CCP will seek to preserve its own power first and then 
to preserve national security.  Ideology will be increasingly less relevant, as long as the 
CCP does not feel strongly threatened. 
2. Understanding the Role of the CCP in Government 
In China, the revolutionary national agenda was not determined by the 
international setting, but rather was largely a reaction against it.  The People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) was founded on October 1, 1949 shortly after the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese civil war.  Since that time, 
the national agenda has been determined by the CCP and characterized by a powerful 
sense of self-determination.  A prominent factor that shaped the foundation of the PRC 
was the “century of humiliation,” in which the Chinese people were repeatedly occupied 
by Western powers and the Japanese.  Additionally, China was devastated by civil wars 
in which left many millions dead.  Not coincidentally, foreign powers also played 
significant roles in China’s civil wars.  The fact its latest civil war was a ‘war of peasant 
nationalism’ suggests that it was not only about domestic class struggle, but also about 
resistance to foreign interference.  Therefore, the CCP was shaped by historical memory 
in such a way that it defined itself as ardently opposed to any foreign intervention in 
‘internal matters’ and had no tolerance for domestic non-conformists. 
The domestic agenda in China is determined by the CCP itself.  Rather than a 
“parallel hierarchy” between the party and government as in some Communist countries, 
China’s CCP dominates the government entirely by mandating party appointments at all 
levels of government.150  In other words, international and domestic pressures do have 
indirect influence on the Party, but the Party itself functions mainly based upon it own 
internal dynamics.  While the Party controls the PLA as it does other branches of 
government, PLA membership in the Party has the military at the center of political 
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activity and power.151  From 1949 to 1962, the PRC followed the Soviet Union’s lead, 
but since that time remained independent of them and even hostile with occasional border 
clashes.  Although the CCP-Soviet alliances had deep ties, China wanted to be treated as 
a respected equal partner and not one to be pressured on matters in Manchuria or Outer 
Mongolia.  Initially, Stalin, for his part, assisted the CCP but would have preferred a 
weak and easily manipulated China. 
The international setting of the Cold War and the U.S. policy of containment 
against communism and Chinese influence in Asia largely meant that China was isolated, 
looked inward or looked to the Soviet Union for aid and a model for industrialization in 
heavy industry.  In other words, Soviet influence in China was limited, temporary, and 
necessary for a limited time, but in order for China to assume ‘its rightful place’ in Asia it 
need to be autonomous and free from influence in ‘internal matters.’  The PRC freed 
itself from Soviet influence following the Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin, détente, 
and “peaceful coexistence which the Chinese labeled as ‘revisionism’.  In many areas, the 
Chinese simply ‘borrowed’ from the Soviets and developed basic models.  The most 
important legacy from the Soviets is ideological, because Marxist-Leninism was 
eventually incorporated into Mao Zedong Thought.  It was Stalin’s influence of Mao in 
the context of “class enemies” and continuing “class struggle” within socialism, that led 
to the creation of disastrous domestic social reforms. 
3. Understanding the Chinese Economy, Legacies, and Reform 
A critical legacy from China’s dynastic past, is the realization by successive 
regimes that the failure to maintain political stability will lead to government collapse.  
With Tiananmen Square in recent memory and increasing social protests, the CCP are 
keenly aware of this potential.  Yet, Mao’s assumption about power emanating from the 
barrel of a gun, neglected what was as true in the 1920s as it is today: power quite often 
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emanates from foreign investment and economic growth.152  Another Maoist legacy is 
that the Soviet brand of industrialization did not utilize China’s natural endowment in 
human capital and further relied heavily on scarce wealth and investment.  It is ironic that 
the adoption of European Marxism-Leninism in 1949 did not provide as much economic 
growth in China as its ‘Asian tiger’ neighbors experienced with Confucian values during 
the same time period.153  The CCP has still had to deal with the fact that economic 
growth in the early stages of the PRC was attained through market distortions, which 
suppressed wages, prices, and currency valuations.  Essentially, the government at that 
time fixed low prices for grain and high prices for industrial products to sustain growth 
and de facto urban favoritism.  By focusing on the development of heavy industry on the 
back of agriculture, and at the expense of consumer goods, such strategy was unable to 
capitalize on China’s comparative advantage and utilize the well-established networks of 
standard market towns and intermediate market towns for efficient exchange. 
Modern CCP leadership since 1978 has most assuredly recognized that Maoist 
discouragement of international trade caused stagnation.  The challenge for the modern 
CCP has been to deal effectively with the enduring socialist legacies, which reduced the 
incentives for profitability in the state-owned industries (SOES).  Target production 
quotas, which have no basis in demand, have poor quality control, and expensive social 
safety nets, have collectively put a drain on the economy.  The processes of gradual 
reforms have reflected not only caution on the part of Chinese leadership, but also more 
importantly the difficulty in withdrawal from such societal-dependence on government. 
Another legacy and holdover has been large rural to urban income disparities, 
which are attributable not only to the favoritism of industry, but also to the limitations on 
migration of the rural people through household registration systems.  Social programs 
such as education, health care, and pensions have all been tied to city residency.  
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However, the modern re-emergence of the market economy has capitalized on the natural 
endowment of abundance in labor and the existing commercial and social networks of the 
macro-regions.  Furthermore, the underemployment socialism caused by ignoring small-
scale family business has recently provided the fuel for rapid growth during modern 
reforms.  Additionally, the legacy of collectivization and subsequent recent attempts to 
reestablish land ownership, have thus far yielded only to the right to use land rather than 
true ownership in the conventional sense. 
B. BEIJING’S VIEW OF THE EU ARMS EMBARGO 
Beijing views the EU arms embargo as an issue of significance and has made 
several diplomatic and economic attempts to lift the embargo.  The majority of the debate 
on this issue has been concentrated during the past five years on the contentious dispute 
between a Washington lobby to maintain the embargo and increasing European openness 
to ending it.  The debate has been argued actively since the 2003 war in Iraq, when 
Europe drifted away from the United States and Beijing tried to capitalize on an 
opportunity for new friendship with Europe.154  That issue aside, very little has been 
discussed concerning Beijing’s viewpoint.  A crude analysis would suggest that Beijing 
would understandably like to see the embargo lifted but given Russian supplies of 
weapons is not particularly troubled by the ban.  Economic interdependence would 
suggest that the strengthening economic relationship with Europe would continue to 
further peace in the future.  Instead, Beijing does indeed place high value on lifting the 
embargo and has actively tried to undermine it.  Increasingly, Europe has grown more 
open to the idea as well.  At stake is the fragile balance of power in Asia and the Taiwan 
Strait in particular. 
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1. Historical Context 
Since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the EU arms embargo on weapons sales and 
technology remains a contentious debate in the triangular relationship among China, the 
EU, and the United States.  When the EU issued its China paper in September 2003, a 
dialogue was initiated on lifting the embargo, and Beijing expressed an “insistence” for 
its immediate end.155  However, in October 2006 an EU official Communication listed 
EU “concerns” prior to an implementation of the EU-China ‘strategic partnership.’  The 
number of EU concerns has grown to include more areas of needed improvement and 
includes such things as progress on human rights (United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of citizens), fair market practices, transparency in military spending, 
implementation of property rights, and fulfillment of WTO obligations.156 
To date, only economic partnerships have been at the forefront of EU-China 
summits, while strategic and political aspects have not been fully addressed, causing the 
period from 2003 to be referred to as a “honeymoon.”157  However, EU ‘concerns’ are 
not necessarily ‘official pre-conditions’ to lifting the embargo.  Therefore, Beijing has a 
small amount of diplomatic space to maneuver and make partial concessions at upcoming 
EU-China summits, if it chooses to do so.  The question remains: what will China be 
willing to concede, if anything, in order to end the last impediment to realizing a true 
‘strategic partnership’ with Europe?  What will Brussels accept and will Washington’s 
response be?  China’s strategy of facilitating new ‘poles’ or ‘multipolarity’ certainly 
suggests that some concessions granted in return for lifting the embargo could be a 
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worthwhile endeavor.158  At a time when Europe has a tarnished image of Washington 
and its perceived unilateral war in Iraq, China and the EU have grown closer but still 
have unresolved critical differences.  
2. Washington’s View, in Direct Contrast with Beijing’s View 
While Beijing has played down its desire for weapons from the EU and the EU 
has played down the EU-China strategic partnership in terms of trade and economic ties, 
Washington views these same issues in a different fashion.  From Washington’s 
perspective, the 2003 EU-China agreement on a ‘strategic partnership’ caused great 
concern that sometime between 2004 and 2005 the ban would be lifted.  In 2004, French 
President Jacques Chirac told Hu Jintao that the arms embargo “no longer makes any 
sense” and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder told Wen Jiabao that he shared this 
sentiment.159  Additionally, Washington is still concerned that the regional balance of 
power issues between China, the United States, and Taiwan are not as vital an issue to the 
Europeans.  However, in Europe, human rights concerns create more of an impasse.  
Furthermore, many American conservative think-tanks and respected China-experts have 
raised alarming questions about an ‘emerging axis’ between China and the EU.  On 
several occasions, Brussels has declared an outright intent to lift the ban, leaving only the 
matter of timing unresolved. 
In spite of attempts by Brussels and Beijing to downplay Washington’s concerns, 
Washington was quite troubled by the strategic implications of the removal of the EU 
arms embargo.  In response to the warming relationship between China and the EU, 
Washington has lobbied hard during the 2004 EU-US dialogue on East Asian security to 
maintain the arms embargo, and has watched the ‘honeymoon’ process closely.  The fact 
the embargo has not yet been lifted and that EU ‘concerns’ over China have grown is 
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suggestive of a relationship that has now gotten more “complicated.”160  The conditions 
by which the EU arms embargo may eventually be lifted or even held firmly in place 
depends entirely on the triangular and dynamic relationship between China, the EU, the 
United States, and the pressures placed on economic, political, and strategic interests.  
Lingering human rights issues, the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, and the Taiwan Strait have 
had little or no progress. 
3. The Significance of the Chinese Desire for Ending the Embargo 
From the Chinese perspective, just how valuable would lifting the embargo even 
be considering the readily available Russian weapons and technology at significantly 
lower cost?  Could it be that the Chinese place low practical importance on the matter?  
However, when considering the possession of advanced ballistic missiles, Su-30 fighters, 
Kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class destroyers, “the missing pieces of the PLA 
puzzle are exactly the sorts of command and control, communications, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance systems that the Europeans are getting ready to sell.”161  
If the Chinese were truly impressed by the precision bombings by U.S. aircraft in Kosovo 
and have expressed a desire to ‘harden’ its own defenses, then the possession of the more 
sophisticated ‘dual-use’ technology,” and NATO command and control and 
communications equipment would share a similar logic.  However, because many EU 
members have interpreted the ban to be on lethal weapons only, many have already “sold 
defense-related technology to China.”162 
Beijing views present efforts to maintain the embargo by Washington to be a 
strategy of containment.  Regardless of terms such as ‘engagement,’ PRC leaders have 
only to look at U.S. policy to recognize intent to contain, ‘soft,’ or otherwise.  For 
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example, after human rights, the Bush Administration has opposed lifting the embargo on 
the basis of only one other point: “that any expanded EU defense sales to China would 
damage U.S. security interests.”163  In 2005, Condoleezza Rice said “the transfer of 
technology might endanger the very delicate military balance, while there are still 
American forces in the region.”164  Similarly, President Bush said that it “would change 
the balance of relations between China and Taiwan.”165  Not unnoticed by Beijing, such 
statements speak directly toward a U.S. desire for a PRC that can neither challenge the 
United States nor the current balances of power with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea 
(vis-à-vis military assistance from China to North Korea). 
4. Bilateral Trade: Economic Momentum for Ending the Ban 
From the economic standpoint of bilateral trade, a contentious area in the EU-
China relationship is the growing trade deficit in China’s favor.  In that regard, the most 
apparent way to begin to reduce the imbalance to some degree is lifting the embargo on 
Europeans weapon sales.  Europe does have a comparative advantage in high-skilled, 
high-technology industries, especially over China and to some degree Russia.  The latest 
round of EU-China negotiations includes the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 
which is intended to modernize the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement.  
For China, fostering this growing relationship is critical to its prospects for economic 
growth because “China has become the largest supplier of the EU, while the EU has 
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become China’s largest trading partner.  The increase in bilateral trade has been dramatic, 
up 20 to 25 percent per year,” and up to $260 billion in 2006.166 
5. China’s Strategy for Ending the Embargo 
China’s strategy for furthering military ties with Europe was made apparent 
during March 18, 2007 meeting between Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and 
French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie.  First, China downplayed its increased 
military spending by saying it is intended for peaceful purposes and is of no threat to 
another country, giving assurances “that much of this year's 17.8 percent increase in 
China’s military budget will go into improving the living conditions of the 2.3 million 
soldiers.”  Second, China has been openly considering a French invitation to “train and 
equip an African peacekeeping force…meant to respond to intra-ethnic and intra-
community violence.”167  As a result, this Chinese strategy opened constructive dialogue 
in support of ending the embargo.  Immediately after this meeting, the French Defense 
Minister was quoted as saying, “The EU arms embargo on China can no longer be 
justified and should be lifted…It’s illogical to keep the arms embargo, and at the same 
time authorize China to host the 2008 Olympic Games…The arms embargo has no 
technical justification and any political justification for the embargo is just baseless.”168  
Surprisingly, as of the summer of 2006, China has had “more personnel enrolled under 
the blue UN flag for police and peace-keeping missions than any other permanent 
member of the UN Security Council or NATO member,” which reflects an earnest strive 
for legitimacy and recognition on the world stage.169 
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The true cause for the initiation of the embargo was the massacre that took place 
in Tiananmen Square.  However, one Chinese strategy commonly invoked for ending the 
embargo is evident in Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s statement downplaying its 
modern relevance: “The European embargo on arms sales to China is well and truly a 
product of the Cold War.  It will be lifted sooner or later as doing so is necessary for the 
sound and harmonious development of relations between China and Europe. We hope 
that the EU will make the decision as soon as possible.”170  Ironically, some of the 
Tiananmen protestors are still in jail and this issue remains a concern for the EU.  In 
defining Beijing’s political interest in lifting the ban, Assistant Foreign Minister Shen 
Guofang said China is “extremely concerned” about the embargo and has been working 
with the EU in finding a way to end it.  He also said “it is not consistent with the existing 
strategic partnerships between China and Europe.  The lifting of the ban will greatly 
promote relations between China and the EU, especially in political development.”171 
6. Chinese Methods for Circumventing the Embargo 
Chinese diplomats have been extremely successful in bypassing the intent of the 
embargo, while having no success in lifting the ban outright.  Since the embargo began, 
European defense-related sales to China have actually increased significantly.  According 
to the EU, “its total defense exports to China doubled from 210 million euros (about $275 
million) in 2002 to 416 million euros (about $545 million) in 2003.  The value of such 
sales in 2003 was eight times that of sales in 2001 (worth 54 million euros).” 172  In fact, 
military sales from the Europeans have included blatant military hardware such as, 
“howitzers, helicopters, fire control radars, jet engines, avionics, diesel engines for naval 
ships and submarines, and satellites.”173  The Chinese have successfully made these 
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purchases by exploiting vague wording in the ban itself and newly developed diplomatic 
ties in Europe.  The PRC government has made no secret of its desire to have the 
embargo lifted and even tried to influence Europeans with additional purchases of Airbus 
A380s contingent specifically on an end to the embargo.174 
PRC leaders have also invested a significant amount of diplomatic efforts during 
the annual EU-China summits and bilateral meetings with European leaders to exploit the 
poorly worded embargo, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the weakly defined 
limitation on sales of ‘non-lethal’ goods, and lack of a limitation on ‘dual use’ items.  Put 
simply, many Europeans have argued that weapons could be controlled much more 
effectively if the embargo were replaced by stronger and regulated, permissible sales.  
Such restrictions, in theory, could restrict further proliferation beyond China to rogue 
states as well.  However, Washington has argued that the embargo should indeed be 
strengthened, but lifting it would allow the sales of even more dangerous Mirage fighters, 
German submarines, and weapons integrating, “command, control, and reconnaissance 
systems.”175  Sources close to the PLA have said that their intent is to acquire “some of 
the world’s best technological products [because] the many weaknesses of its 
conventional weaponry are precisely the ones that can be remedied through introducing 
new products from the EU.”176 
7. Policy Recommendations for Beijing 
Beijing knows three main issues have prevented realizing the full potential of 
economic and strategic partnerships with Europe.  Poor human rights records, cross-Strait 
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relations with Taiwan, and the weapons embargo have “spoiled the party.”177  From 
Beijing’s perspective, human rights and the question of Taiwan are internal matters of the 
kind to be free from interference.  In contrast, Beijing sees the weapons embargo as 
altogether different and solidly in the realm of political and international discourse and 
negotiation.  The problem for Beijing, aside from Washington’s strong influence in 
Brussels, is that for the Europeans human rights and to a lesser degree the cross-Strait 
relationship is closely tied to easing the embargo.  Beijing has rejected the accusations 
that it is trying to “hold the EU hostage” by withholding economic favor until the 
embargo has been lifted and also has rejected the notion that China needs the weapons or 
technology at all.178  Instead, Beijing has officially stated, “that lifting the embargo is to 
be understood as a signal that the EU is accepting and acknowledging China as an equal 
partner on the international stage.”179  However, that statement, downplaying the 
importance of weapons as an issue was recent and is markedly different from the strong 
calls it had made from 2003 to 2005 for the embargo to be lifted.  The apparent display of 
ambivalence is merely an attempt to minimize the critical issues of human rights and 
Taiwan, while implying unfair treatment by the West.  The current strategy of Beijing is 
patient and consistent with promoting ‘China’s peaceful rise’ as an ‘economic 
opportunity’ rather than the Western suspicions of a ‘China threat.’  Time is in China’s 
favor. 
Increasingly, China’s economic ties with Europe and many other parts of the 
world have been strengthening, as has the military capability of the PLA.  The ban will 
likely be lifted within five or ten years as long as the PRC remains stable on the critical 
issues of human rights and cross-Strait relations.  For now, China’s attempts to lift the 
embargo and gain a fully realized ‘strategic partnership’ with Europe have failed.  Its 
newest strategy used in the 2007 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is 
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intended to play toward its economic strengths and continue its use of “soft power” to 
open European markets to Chinese trade.180  It should be noted that the current 
framework and legal basis for governing EU- China relations rests with the 1985 Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (TECA).  Although the EU-China summit of 
September 2006 declared an attempt to adopt a new PCA and discussions began in 
January 2007, a formal PCA is not in place and the TECA currently remains the legal 
basis for EU-China relations.181 
China has recognized that bilateral talks with European nations such as France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands have been much more successful in gaining support.  In 
contrast, direct negotians with the EU has been problematic because of the nature of 
multilateral views and a subsequent lack of consensus on the embargo.  However, the 
absence of supporters such as the former French President Jacques Chirac and German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder from Germany will also require further patience for the 
next several years on Beijing’s part.  Over time, prudent domestic and foreign policies, 
increased economic ties with Europe, and a successful 2008 Olympics will serve to 
weaken resolve on the embargo and strengthen the case for an adequate substitution. 
C. U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE EMBARGO 
1. Considerations of Security, Trade, and Human Rights  
Members of the EU have demonstrated a greater propensity for arms sales to the 
PRC than to Taiwan.  Given American security interests in East Asia, Washington is 
understandably more concerned with balance of power issues between itself and the PRC 
and the PRC and Taiwan.  Its concern is likely to remain well into the future, particularly 
as PRC defense spending and relative military power in the region continues to shift in 
China’s favor.  There is no doubt that military hardware and dual-use technology from 
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the EU has indeed bypassed the arms embargo.  In terms of the cross-Strait balance of 
power, it is interesting to note that EU member states have been much more careful in 
restricting military items bound for Taiwan than to the PRC.  For example, in 1991, the 
French sold Lafayette frigates and Mirage fighters to Taiwan, but there is no further 
evidence of EU transfers to Taiwan since that time.182  Furthermore, Washington’s 
inability to fulfill its April 2001 promise of helping Taiwan purchase eight diesel 
submarines and related technology (presumably from Germany or the Netherlands), 
reflects great reluctance in Europe to anger the PRC.183  EU member states have abided 
by an agreed one China policy and, as requested by the PRC, have agreed “not to sell to 
Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, materials or technology that can be used for 
military purposes.”184  Further clarifying the EU stance, the European Commission stated 
its policy in 2006 by saying, “The EU has a significant stake in the maintenance of cross-
Straits peace and stability.  On the basis of its One China Policy, and taking account of 
the strategic balance in the region, the EU should continue to take an active interest, and 
to make its views known to both sides.”185  During a January 2007 joint press conference 
between Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and visiting EU counterpart Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, Li had a forceful yet clear position on the matter of Taiwan.  “I hope 
the EU side can make concerted efforts with China to combat Taiwan independence and 
jointly safeguard the peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits, in the Asian and 
Pacific region and the whole world.”186 
The issues regarding human rights are particularly relevant given approach of the 
2008 Olympics and unrest in Tibet.  The liberal use of the death penalty remains the most 
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contentious human rights issue for the EU and the United States.  Although the EU does 
not approve of the use of the death penalty under any circumstance, particularly by the 
United States, the issue should be placed in the proper relative context.  According to a 
2004 estimate by a Chinese legislator, Chen Zhonglin, China executes as many as 10,000 
prisoners per year for 68 possible offenses that go beyond the traditional capital offenses 
of rape and murder and include non-violent crimes such as tax fraud, embezzlement, 
various drug crimes, and political crimes.187  Furthermore, the use of torture and a lack of 
an independent judiciary complicate Western sentiments on China’s human rights record.  
Though EU-China relations have improved, it is fair to characterize EU attitudes on 
China’s human rights record as initially hopeful and now of general disappointment.  The 
EU Commission made this characterization on the matter, “the EU’s expectations – 
which have increased in line with the quality of our partnership – are increasingly not 
being met.”188 
Trade continues to be the major force drawing the EU and China closer together, 
yet in 2005 also has helped to cool the blissful outlook of the EU-China dialogue on 
lifting the embargo.  According to the EU Commission, EU trade to China from 2000 to 
2005 increased by more than 100 percent, the largest increase in the world, and China’s 
exports to the EU constitute almost 20 percent of its total.189  The EU has recognized 
China to be “an important source of growth for the EU,” while also blaming China’s 
current growth model as “the source of important imbalances in EU-China trade.”  
Specifically, the EU has argued that it also in China’s best interest to revalue its currency 
to help address the trade imbalance as well as to “contain risks of overheating, and at the 
same time meet China’s shared responsibility to ensure a stable and balanced world 
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economy.”190  However, China’s willingness to entertain Western demands to revalue its 
currency, have been by Western standards, unsatisfactory. 
2. An Appropriate U.S. Policy toward China 
a. Addressing the Challenges: the Taiwan Question 
Finding an appropriate U.S. policy toward China is particularly 
challenging given the complexities of American security commitments in East Asia and 
especially in Taiwan.  Policies of “strategic ambiguity” admittedly do conflict with the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA), which states “It is the policy of the United States 
to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the 
United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize 
the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.191”  Moreover, 
the three of the “Six Assurances” of 1982 state that, 
1.  The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to 
Taiwan. 
2.  The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations 
Act. 
3.  The United States would not consult with China in advance before 
making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.192 
In understanding the modern relevance of the “Taiwan question,” it should 
be noted that as recently as March 4, 2008, National People’s Congress spokesperson, 
Jiang Enzhu said that “If the Chen Shui-bian authorities [then Taiwanese President] 
should stubbornly continue down the path [toward independence], they will surely pay a 
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dear price.”193  Although the spokesperson did not elaborate on the threat, the implication 
is quite clear given the 2005 Anti-Secession Law.  Furthermore, neither the EU nor the 
United States would support any incendiary moves toward independency.  The March 22, 
2008 election of Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, seems to have dampened 
even the most subtle gestures toward independence.  However, sentiments toward formal 
independence, formal recognition, and entry into the UN under the name of Taiwan 
rather than the Republic of China, are likely to remain causes of contention beyond the 
current Taiwanese presidency. 
b. Current U.S. Policy 
Washington’s political motivations or incentives for perpetuating the EU’s 
arms embargo on China and even its own embargo have changed since 1989.  According 
to Frans Paul van der Putten, first, the EU’s initial impetus for the emplacement of the 
embargo was to pressure the Chinese government into easing its aggression toward pro-
democracy activists.  Second, over time the embargo was used as a political tool to 
pressure the PRC toward human rights improvements.  Third, the embargo became 
emblematic with issues of the cross-Strait balance of power that did not exist between 
1979 and 1995.194  Though the elevation of these issues arose over time, their relative 
importance to the issue of the embargo has not declined with time.  This is to say that all 
of these issues still have relevance and have gained contemporary importance 
collectively.  In addition, pro-democracy demonstrators remain in jail to this day and 
human rights issues remain at the fore with an unratified ICCPR.  Olympics protests and 
demonstrations in Tibet have also added to the contemporary relevance of these issues.  
Though EU governments are not as directly affected by potential conflict in Taiwan as is 
the United States, they do support a one-China policy which promotes non-use of force.  
Of great importance to American leaders, many EU member states have been eager to 
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befriend China, receive lucrative contracts, and are often tempted with the sale of 
military-related equipment and technology to China. 
Washington’s political motivations for maintaining the EU arms embargo 
have paralleled the EU’s path over time, but have considerably more emphasis and 
greater importance on the cross-Strait balance of power issues.  Perpetuating the status 
quo with regard to Taiwan has been the most appealing option for Washington given the 
potential alternatives involving conflict.  Non-confrontational strategic ambiguity has 
fostered the least amount of potential for antagonism.  For its part, Beijing is also 
satisfied with the status quo, which necessitates minimal saber rattling on the part of 
Taiwan and peaceful talks advocating re-unification under the pretense of one-country, 
two-systems.  As with the EU, Washington would also benefit enormously from military 
sales to China, but this option remains highly problematic and untenable for Washington.  
Ironically, f the EU arms embargo were to be lifted, perpetuating the U.S. embargo would 
also be more difficult, given the competitive nature of U.S. and EU defense industries 
and the potential for lost sales to Europe.  The most attractive option for Washington is 
and has been applying some political pressure on the EU, while emphasizing to the 
Europeans the importance of transatlantic institutions such NATO and the necessity of 
realizing quantifiable human rights improvements in China.  In that regard, the nature of 
the U.S. policy to perpetuate the EU arms embargo shares a parallel logic with the 
Taiwan question.  Because of the intricate complexities within the triangular relationship 
and the broad effects on the embargo by security issues, human rights and trade concerns, 
it is in the best interests of the United States, the EU, and the PRC to perpetuate the status 
quo in the near term and defer, delay, and optimistically avoid the preconditions for 
potential conflict. 
c. Policy Recommendations 
It is in the best interests of the United States, the EU, and the PRC to 
maintain positively engaged in diplomatic and economic relations.  It is natural that the 
EU, with the world’s largest market and world’s emergent “global reserve currency,” and 
the PRC, the world’s fourth largest economy and third largest exporter, would seek close 
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ties with each other.195  Since the Cold War’s end the relative power of the EU and the 
PRC will inevitably increase and inevitably mature toward multipolarity.  In terms of 
globalization and economic trade, the rise of other actors does not necessitate a zero-sum 
game; the benefits are most often mutually beneficial.  In terms of military balances of 
power, the rise of other actors requires that the United States remain engaged and foster 
positive relationships, which foster trust and cooperation.  While China’s leaders often 
speak of grandiose democratic reforms, the reality is that it will remain extremely hesitant 
to institute liberalizing political reforms.  What China says and what it does often appear 
to be contradictory, yet its leaders would argue that its expectations of rates of change 
differ with the West.  Its leaders would also argue that its pace as a “developing nation” is 
as good as should be expected, particularly given its size and domestic challenges.  The 
best strategy for all sides has remained encouraging friendly dialogue, while fostering 
constructive change.  Harsh criticisms of China by the West have been historically 
counterproductive in terms of qualitative change. 
Maintaining the embargo remains problematic on all sides of the triangular 
relationship.  For China, the embargo is reminiscent of the Cold War and places it in an 
unenviable position amongst other embargoed nations such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.  Yet 
China’s economic might and potential markets in the globalized arena, place it squarely 
among the best in the world particularly with regard to purchasing power parity (PPP) 
annual growth rates.  China remains of too great an importance to isolate or ignore.  
Certainly, China has made impressive efforts to integrate into diplomatic and economic 
organizations, yet is unwilling to satisfy Western appeals to reform politically in what it 
views as internal affairs.  In that regard, over time China has been able to integrate itself 
more and more, albeit to limited degrees, without having to satisfy much of what has 
been asked of it.  To be sure, China has had steady progress in economic liberalization, 
but political reforms are for the time being unattainable.  From China’s view, maintaining 
the status quo, in terms of resisting political reforms, has been paying off.  Because a 
current balance exists on all sides of the triangular relationship, China’s calls to lift the 
                                                 
195 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, Brussels, October 24, 2006, 1, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0631en01.pdf (accessed May 9, 2008). 
  76
embargo have not been as vociferous as they might otherwise be.  This is to say that 
China would like to have the embargo lifted in order to realize recognition as a respected 
partner and would also like to acquire greater weapons and weapons-related technology, 
but not enough to either reform itself or perhaps more importantly to anger its most 
important trading partners, the EU and the United States.  For now, the emerging 
strategic partnership between China and the EU has been positive, but the United States 
must insist that the embargo remain in place. 
China has an incentive to continue to integrate itself into international 
economic and diplomatic circles, without yielding much in the way of political reforms, 
which it sees as potentially self-destructive.  Its behavior will likely be predictable.  The 
EU and the United States are likely to engage China, as this strategy has yielded great 
economic benefit to both.  Yet each must tactfully insist on improvements in human 
rights prior to acquiescence.  To yield on the issue of the embargo is to admit to and 
relegate that human rights have little relative importance when compared with trade.  
Issues of human rights, coupled with security concerns, have for the time being 
outweighed economic motivations for lifting the embargo.  Such a move would be 
problematic given the domestic public sentiments on those issues.  China’s failure to 
ratify the ICCPR and pass the 2005 Anti-Secession Law has perpetuated the embargo to 
the benefit of the United States and Taiwan.  If China had ratified the ICCPR, 
implemented to some modest political reforms, freed some of the Tiananmen protestors 
and not passed the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, the embargo would have undoubtedly been 
lifted in late 2005.  Little argument could have been made to prevent its lifting if China 
had acted in ways which indicated conformity to internationally accepted norms.  
Ironically, those decisions by the PRC have perpetuated the embargo, but also maintained 
the peaceful and balanced status quo.  For China, the path to lifting the embargo is clear, 
though it remains unwilling to choose that path because of its political insecurities.  The 
greatest irony is that the embargo would likely have been lifted had China simply not 
passed the 2005 Anti-Secession Law alone.  The previous issues relate to a lack of 
political reform, which has been particularly disheartening for Western observers.  
However, the matter of the 2005 law reflects an unwillingness to renounce the use of 
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violence on the matter of Taiwan.  In fact, it proclaims it.  That issue alone is enough to 
perpetuate the embargo, but the issues of human rights and a lack of political reforms 
make the case much easier for Washington to argue.  China’s timing on the matter could 
not have been more perfect for Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo.  For now, the EU’s hands 
are, metaphorically speaking, tied.  Political movement on the issue of the embargo 
appears stagnant, but is in actuality awaiting Beijing’s next move by way of reforms. 
China’s principles of non-interference and surplus in currency exchange 
have made it particularly appealing in the third world.  In China’s quest for natural 
resources, particularly in Africa, it has been well received because it readily contributes 
capital and quite understandably asks little of its hosts in the way of prerequisites to 
human rights improvements.  While an attractive attribute for China in the third world, 
maintaining this strategy indefinitely will remain “increasingly untenable” given its 
growing “economic importance” and “increasingly active diplomatic commitments” 
including those in the UNSC.196  This is to say that more and more in the way of world 
leadership will be required of China.  Greater responsibilities coincide well with China’s 
desire for respect, but are admittedly in conflict with “non-interference.”  China’s 
behavior is likely to change slowly as it begins to recognize itself in a new role of 
prominence in the world. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In more fully understanding China-U.S. relations as they pertain to the embargo, 
it is helpful to understand that the drivers of Beijing’s foreign policies, the role of the 
CCP in government, and its economic legacies and reforms.  These issues uncover 
several historical complexities that lead to limitations on how much Beijing is politically 
willing or able to accommodate Western concerns.  How Beijing views the embargo and 
attempts to circumvent it is also reflective of some of these legacies.  In the analysis of 
appropriate U.S. policies toward China and recommendations on improving bilateral ties 
with respect to the embargo and security issues, human rights, and trade concerns, the 
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attractiveness in maintaining the status quo is apparent.  In much the same way that 
strategic ambiguity and the status quo have afforded relative peace to the Taiwan 
question, the status of the embargo also benefits Beijing, Brussels, and Washington more 
by maintaining the status quo.  Admittedly, the EU arms embargo remains a difficulty 
and an embarrassment in the triangular relationship, but attempts to lift it have for the 
time being, created more problems than benefit.  Until China is willing to concede on 
some very basic human rights requests and lessen the rhetoric advocating force in 
Taiwan, it will likely not see the embargo lifted. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
Since 2001, the status of the EU arms embargo on China has had important 
implications for the United States and its policy-makers.  American leaders have been 
faced with tough decisions on an appropriate and consistent policy toward China that 
addresses its rapidly growing economy and military capabilities.  Additionally, the lack 
of political reform in China, and its involvement in weapons proliferation, and human 
rights abuses have complicated the search for consistent policies.  Within three bilateral 
relationships, U.S.-EU, China-EU, and China-U.S., the status of the embargo has both 
been perpetuated and weakened by the issues relating to security, human rights, and 
trade.  The embargo debate continues to raise awareness on these issues as well as to 
competing interests and concerns over the true intent of an EU-China strategic 
partnership. 
American security interests would certainly be negatively affected if the EU were 
to lift the embargo.  The strategic implications of such an action would disrupt the current 
regional balances of power and potentially raise the possibility of conflict.  The EU has 
great economic interest in lifting the embargo in terms of gains in total trade, weapons 
sales, and the export of dual-use technology.  Certainly, American pressure has affected 
the EU’s decision-making about the embargo and encouraged popular support within the 
EU to wane because of human rights concerns.  While U.S.-EU relations were strained by 
EU attempts to lift the embargo, concerns over counterbalancing by China and the EU 
against the United States have largely disappeared since 2005, when formal and 
concerted efforts to lift the embargo stalled.  American policy-makers have continued to 
discourage EU governments from making shortsighted efforts to obtain financial gains 
without first considering long-term strategic implications in the cross-Straits and human 
rights improvements in China. 
There is no doubt that China hopes to gain military technology from Europe that 
would help to lessen trade imbalances and improve technical disadvantages its military 
faces.  Such a strategy is a part of China’s quest for a normalized relationship with the 
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EU, but because of China’s unwillingness to concede on some issues this relationship has 
not truly been realized.  In this regard, the EU relies on a post-Westphalian model of 
cooperation and consensus-building that yields a measure of authority in order to gain 
mutual benefit.  In contrast, China has been politically inflexible and unwilling to accept 
EU attempts to socialize it toward this end.  The 2005 Anti-Secession law and China’s 
failure to address EU human rights concerns by ratifying the UN’s International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights have been factors in perpetuating the embargo.  
Furthermore, China’s perpetual refusal to release the still imprisoned Tiananmen Square 
protesters has given credibility to China’s human rights observers. 
Current Sino-EU relations have indeed been strained by the failed attempts to lift 
the embargo and by bilateral trade disputes.  Such issues have functioned to cool the 
strength and character of the EU-China strategic partnership and also to reassure 
Washington’s concern as to the trajectory of this partnership.  However, the fact that 
China and the EU still actively discuss the embargo warrants continued American 
observation and interest.  An effective U.S. policy toward China should continue to 
perpetuate the embargo because it serves to balance maintaining security issues with 
advocating improvements to human rights in China.  Lost trade and defense sales result 
as a consequence of the embargo, but this deficit is a small price to pay for the 
maintenance of regional peace and stability.  The future of the embargo rests almost 
entirely upon China’s willingness to act on its own political reforms.  At present, China 
has remained unwilling to make tangible improvements, so the embargo is likely to 
remain in effect in the short term.  Through experience, EU and American leaders have 
been somewhat cautious of harsh official criticisms of China, because such efforts have 
been largely counterproductive to policies of engagement.  As a result, EU and American 
leaders have become largely pessimistic over their expectations about the relative pace of 
Chinese reforms.  Current EU and American policies continue to encourage China to 
reform, but are not outwardly hostile in nature.  In conclusion, it is important to note that 
Washington, Beijing, and Brussels have all benefited from the current status quo and 
balance between competing interests, even though the embargo issue remains unresolved. 
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